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Abstract
We discuss a binary nature of funding impacts. Under some conditions, funding is either cost or
benefit, i.e., one of the lending/borrowing rates does not play any role in pricing derivatives. When
we price derivatives, considering different lending/borrowing rates leads to semi-linear BSDEs and
PDEs, so we need to solve the equations numerically. However, once we can guarantee that only one
of the rates affects pricing, we can recover linear equations and derive analytic formulae. Moreover, as
a byproduct, our results explain how debt value adjustment (DVA) and funding benefits are different.
It is often believed that DVA and funding benefits are overlapped but it will be shown that the two
components are affected by different mathematical structures of derivative transactions. We will see
later that FBA occurs where the payoff is non-increasing, but this relationship becomes weaken as the
funding choices of underlying assets are transferred to repo markets.
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
 Introduction
The financial crisis in - has forced us to examine many parts of general practice to price
derivatives. In the crisis, the defaults of big firms heightened default risk. Moreover, banks became
more reluctant to lend money and, as a result, the gap between London inter-bank offered rate (LI-
BOR) and overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate was widened. By the changed market conditions, banks
began to make several adjustments in derivative prices. It has long been a standard to make credit
value adjustment (CVA). CVA is correcting derivative prices for the risk of counterparty’s default. On
the other hand, debt value adjustment (DVA) is a deduction for the hedger’s own default. If one party
defaults earlier than the contractual maturity, a promised payment should be settled as close-out
amount. However, because of the default, the obligation may not fully honored. For the risk, it is
general that collateral is pledged. Funding value adjustment (FVA) is the adjustment of derivative
prices for the excessive cost and benefit in maintaining the hedging portfolio and posting collateral.
Considering entity-specific information in derivative prices has required many changes in clas-
sical pricing theory. First, since law of one price does not hold, when a price is given for a con-
tract, it may be an arbitrage opportunity for a trader, but may not be for others. For the issue,
entity-specific definitions of arbitrage opportunity and fair values were suggested by Bichuch et al.
(); Bielecki et al. (); Bielecki & Rutkowski () and those arguments were applied to var-
ious derivatives (Kim et al., a,b, for example). In addition, many other pricing methodologies
have been developed. A replication pricing under FVA with collateral was introduced by Piterbarg
(). Li & Wu (); Wu () also discussed replication pricing with CVA, FVA with collat-
eral. For risk-neutral valuation principle, readers can refer to Brigo et al. (). Crépey (a,b)
discussed min-variance pricing under default risks, funding spreads, and collateral.
Still, there have remained many puzzles among the adjustments. Especially, DVA and FVA have
their own but intertwined issues. First, there is a doubt on reporting DVA, which is to say that an
aggravation of own default risk can be beneficial to the shareholders. As we will see later, theoret-
ically, the increase of own default risk can be monetized by buying back their bonds. However, it
is often impossible in practice because the bank should really default to realize the benefit. Indeed,
DVA is accepted by both IFRS and GAAP, but excluded from common equity tier  capital (CET),
which is a proxy of shareholder’s wealth. Second, it is often believed that DVA double-counts fund-
ing benefits (see Remark .). FVA has two parts: funding benefit adjustment (FBA) and funding cost
adjustment (FCA). Both DVA and FBA may originate from banks’ own default risk. DVA is a deduc-
tion from liabilities of a bank due to its creditworthiness. On the other hand, FBA, as a counterpart
of FCA, may countervail FCA which is also from the bank’s own default risk. Thus, including both
DVA and FBA may inflate the bank’s reported profit (see Cameron, ) as well as deflate the price
charged to counterparties. Possibly due to these reasons, seller’s DVA is often excluded in derivative
transactions.
FVA is more arguable. According toModigliani-Miller (MM) theorem, which is a long-established
financial principle, choices of funding should not be considered in pricing. On the other hand, in
practice, with the increased interest rates offered by funding desks, it will be loss to the traders with-
out recouping the funding costs from counterparties. Indeed, traders feel confident that funding
costs are observable in derivative transactions (see Andersen et al., )). If the traders’ belief is
true, the inclusion of FVA in derivative prices may be justified by market frictions, which is a viola-

tion of the assumptions of MM theorem (see Modigliani & Miller, ; Stiglitz, ). However, as
pointed out by Hull & White (), if FVA is really an element to determine derivative prices, the
existence of Treasury bonds is mysterious that banks buy a bond that returns less than their funding
rates.
The above issues will be discussed by the main results of this paper. Our main contribution is
showing a binary nature of FVA that FVA is either FCA or −FBA for many derivative contracts. For
example, we shall see later that, based on our model, when buying bonds, the trader will never enter
a borrowing position, i.e., FCA = 0 and FVA = −FBA. If we assume the lending rate is equal to OIS
rate (for example, as in Burgard & Kjaer, ), we have FVA = 0. This may explain the reason why
banks do not require FVA when buying Treasury bonds, while FVA is observable in other derivative
transactions.
The switching between funding costs and benefits depends on the structures of derivative pay-
offs, close-out conventions, and choices of funding, e.g., from a repo market or treasury department.
The structure to determine the binary nature of funding impacts is whether the payoffs of derivatives
increase or decrease in underlying assets. On the other hand, since DVA is a deduction on derivative
payables, DVA occurs where the payoffs are positive. Therefore, DVA and FBA are affected by differ-
ent mathematical structures of the payoffs. Indeed, it will be shown later by an example that DVA
and FBA are clearly separated and this result is in line with a part of the conclusion in Andersen et al.
() that DVA should be considered in pricing.
The difference between FBA and DVA were also pointed out by Albanese & Andersen (). It
was shown that FBA is larger than DVA mainly because of the effective discounting rate and absence
of default indicator in the definition even though FBA and DVA are quite similar. In their case
study, FBA was % larger than DVA. However, we will see later that FBA and DVA are not even
close in some cases (see Table , for example). The values of FBA and DVA often resemble because
of the funding choices commonly taken in the literature that all underlying assets can be acquired
from repo markets. When available, repo markets are preferred by dealers, but it is not always
possible. As we will see later, FBA occurs where the payoff is non-increasing, but the more assets are
traded through repo markets, the weaker this relationship becomes. Readers may want to refer to
Remark .-(iv, v) in advance.
Our results are also related to accounting with FVA. In FCA/FBA accounting, which is endorsed
by some leading banks, DVA is recorded in Contra-Liability (CL) account and
FCA− (FBA−DVA)
is recorded in Contra-Asset (CA) account (see Castagna, ). It has been pointed out that this
accounting method engenders large asset/liability asymmetry. According to the binary nature of
funding impacts, the large asymmetry is inevitable since, for some derivative contracts, either FCA=
0 or FBA= 0, and DVA,FBA, i.e., FCA does not countervail FBA and FBA is not overlapped with DVA.
FVA/FDA accounting, as an alternative, was suggested to recover asset/liability symmetry as well as
protect CET capital, which is a proxy of shareholder’s wealth (see Albanese & Andersen, , for
example). Readers can refer to Andersen et al. () for the issue of shareholder’s wealth protection
with funding spreads.
Another benefit of our results is that we can recover linear equations to price derivatives. Be-
cause different lending/borrowing rates make the pricing equations semi-linear, analytic solutions

are not generally allowed. Therefore, we need to solve the equations numerically, and sometimes the
computational cost becomes expensive. For an attempt to approximate FVA of contracts with short
maturity, readers may want to refer to Gobet & Pagliarani (). Moreover, there have been several
attempts to find closed-form solutions under funding spreads (Bichuch et al., ; Brigo et al., ;
Piterbarg, ). Still, in the arguments, the crucial assumption was the same lending/borrowing
rates. This itself can bee seen as a strong assumption. However, once we can guarantee that one
of funding rates does not play any role in pricing derivatives, we can assume the same lending and
borrowing rates without loss of generality (because the dealer will never switch from one to another).
Put differently, our results allow their results widely applicable.
Even though the binary nature allows us to find analytic formulae for a large class of derivatives,
depending on the close-out conventions, the analytic formulae may or may not be represented by
a closed-form. In this paper, we deal with two close-out conventions: clean price and replacement
cost. clean price (resp. replacement cost) is the risk-neutral price without (resp. with) with value
adjustments. Under clean close-out, because pricing measures are not matched, the analytic formulae
can not be represented in a closed-form. Indeed, to avoid the inconsistency, Bichuch et al. ()
assumed a flexibility to choose a pricing measure for calculating close-out amount, and Brigo et al.
() considered only un-collateralized contracts with null cash-flow at defaults. In the case of
replacement close-out, the mismatch does not appear, because, in our model, the funding rates are
tacitly embedded to the replacement cost. Therefore, we can provide closed-form solutions under
replacement close-out.
In our model, we include incremental CVA, DVA, FVA, and variation margin. The reference fil-
tration is generated by a Brownian motion. Then we progressively enlarge the filtration by default
times of the two parties. The default times are assumed to have intensities. We do not assume that
interest rates are deterministic, so our results can be applied to interest rate derivatives. In the main
theorems, we assume volatility and default intensities are deterministic to avoid heavy calculations,
but stochastic parameters do not necessarily change the main results. We report one example that
intensities are not deterministic in Appendix.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section , we introduce our setup on the filtration, inten-
sities, and construct the incremental hedging portfolio. In Section ., we introduce a BSDE to price
derivatives on the enlarged filtration. Instead of dealing with the BSDE, we define XVA (x-value
adjustment) process in Section .. and the XVA process is reduced to a BSDE on the reference fil-
tration as in Crépey & Song (). Then our main results are provided in Section . For proving
the main theorems, iterative transformations of the XVA process are needed and the transformations
depend on the close-out conventions. The proofs for the main theorems are reported in Appendix.
In Section , examples are examined and we provide a closed-form solution for a stock call option
with replacement close-out.
 Modeling
. Mathematical Setup
We consider two parties entering a bilaterally cleared contract. We call one party a “hedger” and
the other party a “counterparty”. We sometimes address the hedger (resp. counterparty) “she” (resp.

“he”). An index H (resp. C) will be used to represent the hedger (resp. counterparty). The argument
of this paper is conducted in view of the hedger. The hedger is a financial firm that holds a portfolio to
hedge the exchanged cash-flows of the contract. The counterparty may or may not be a non-financial
firm. Note that when we say a “dealer”, “bank”, and “trader”, it is not necessarily addressing the
hedger since the counterparty can be also a bank.
Let (Ω,G,Q) be a probability space, where Q is a risk-neutral probability measure. Let E denote
the expectation under Q. We consider random times τi , i ∈ {H,C},
τi : (Ω,G)→ (R+,B(R+))),
which represent the default times of the hedger and counterparty. For i ∈ {H,C}, we assume that
Q(τi = 0) = 0 and Q(τi > t) > 0, ∀t ∈ R+. We also denote
τ≔ τH ∧ τC , τ¯ ≔ τ ∧T ,
where T is the maturity of the bilateral contract.
LetW = (W 1, . . . ,W n) be a standard n-dimensional Brownian motion under Q. Let F = (Ft)t≥0 be
the usual natural filtration of (Wt)t≥0. Then we define
G = (Gt)t≥0≔
(
Ft ∨σ
(
{τi ≤ u} : u ≤ t, i ∈ {H,C}
))
t≥0
.
We call F (resp. G) the reference filtration (resp. full filtration).
Then we consider a filtered probability space (Ω,G,G,Q). Note that τi , i ∈ {H,C}, are G-stopping
times but may not be F-stopping times. As a convention, for anyG-progressively measurable process
u, (G,Q)-semimartingaleU , and s ≤ t,
∫ t
s
us dUs ≔
∫
(s,t]
us dUs,
where the integral is well-defined. In addition, for any G-stopping time θ and process (ξt)t≥0, we
denote
ξθ· ≔ ξ·∧θ ,
and when ξθ− exists,∆ξθ ≔ ξθ−ξθ−. In what follows, for i ∈ {H,C}, t ≥ 0, we denoteGit ≔Q(τi > t|Ft),
and
Gt ≔Q(τ > t|Ft).
The following assumption stands throughout this paper.
Assumption .. (i) (Gt)t≥0 is non-increasing and absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue mea-
sure.

(ii) For any i ∈ {H,C}, there exists a process hi , defined as
hit ≔ lim
u↓0
1
u
Q(t < τi ≤ t +u,τ > t|Ft)
Q(τ > t|Ft)
,
and the processM i , given by
M it ≔ 1τi≤t∧τ −
∫ t∧τ
0
his ds,
is a (G,Q)-martingale.
For any i ∈ {H,C}, there exists a process hi , defined as
hit ≔ lim
u↓0
1
u
Q(t < τi ≤ t +u,τ > t|Ft)
Q(τ > t|Ft)
,
and the processM i , given by
M it ≔ 1τi≤t∧τ −
∫ t∧τ
0
his ds,
is a (G,Q)-martingale.
By (i) in Assumption ., there exists an F-progressively mesaurable process (h0t )t≥0 such that
h0t = lim
u↓0
1
u
P(t < τ ≤ t +u |Ft)
P(τ > t|Ft)
,
and
Mt ≔ 1τ≤t −
∫ t∧τ
0
h0s ds
is also a (G,P)-martingale. Let us denote h ≔ hH + hC . If τH and τC are independent on F, h0 = h.
It is in general not the case. Moreover, by (i) in Assumption ., τ avoids any F-stopping time (see
Coculescu & Nikeghbali, , Corollary .). In other words, for any F-stopping time τF,
Q(τ = τF) = 0. (.)
The next lemma is borrowed from Bielecki et al. () and Chapter  in Bielecki & Rutkowski
().
Lemma .. Let i ∈ {H,C}.
(i) Let U be an Fs-measurable, integrable random variable for some s ≥ 0. Then, for any t ≤ s,
E(1s<τU |Gt) =1t<τG−1t E(GsU |Ft),
E(1s<τiU |Gt) =1t<τi (Git)−1E(GisU |Ft).

(ii) Let (Ut)t≥0 be a real-valued, F-predictable process and E|Uτ¯ | <∞. Then,
E(1τ=τi≤TUτ |Gt) = 1t<τG−1t E
(∫ T
t
hisGsUs ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
)
.
We define spaces of random variables, and stochastic processes as follows.
Definition .. Let m ∈ N and p ≥ 2.
• L
p
T : the set of all FT -measurable random variables ξ, such that
‖ξ‖p ≔ E[|ξ |p]
1
p <∞.
• S
p
T : the set of all real valued, F-adapted, càdlàg
 processes (Ut)t≥0, such that
‖U‖SpT ≔ E
(
sup
t≤T
|Ut |p
) 1
p <∞.
• H
p,m
T : the set of all R
m-valued, F-predictable processes (Ut)t≥0, such that
‖U‖HpT ≔ E
(∫ T
0
∣∣∣Ut ∣∣∣pdt
) 1
p
<∞.
• H
p,m
T ,loc : the set of all R
m-valued, F-predictable processes (Ut)t≥0, such that
∫ T
0
∣∣∣Ut∣∣∣p dt <∞, a.s.
Moreover, we let Dθ = (D
1
θ , . . . ,D
n
θ) denote Malliavin derivative at θ ≥ 0, and D1,2 denote the set of
Malliavin differentiable randomvariables. ForMalliavin calculus, readers can refer to Di Nunno et al.
() and Section . in El Karoui et al. (). In the next section, we describe hedging portfolios
under incremental CVA, DVA, FVA, and collateral. These aggregated adjustment is often called XVA.
For simplicity in notations, when n = 1, we denote Dθ =D
1
θ,W =W
1, and H
p
T ≔H
p,1
T , H
p
T ,loc ≔H
p,1
T ,loc.
. BSDEs under Incremental XVA
.. Cash-flows
We consider a hedger and counterparty entering a “new” contract which exchanges promised divi-
dends. First, we proceed our argument with the assumption that the two parties have not made any
contract before the new contract. Later, this assumption will be relaxed by slightly modifying our
model so that incremental effects can be considered.
Right continuous and left limit

Let DNt denote the accumulated amount of the promised dividends up to t ≥ 0. We assume that
D
N is an F-adapted càdàg process, and the value is determined by an n-dimensional underlying asset
process S = (S1, . . . ,Sn) that follows the next stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dS it =rtS
i
t dt +σ
i
t S
i
t dWt , i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, (.)
for some F-progressively measurable processes r and (σ i)⊤ ∈ Rn. In addition, we assume that the
F-adapted process DN is independent of the information of defaults.
Remark .. Note that an F-adapted process may depend on default risks, since the default intensi-
ties are F-adapted.
If a default occurs before the maturity of the contract T , two parties stop exchanging DN , and
the derivative contract is marked-to-market. The method to calculate the close-out amount is de-
termined before initiation of the contract and documented in Credit Support Annex (CSA). Let eNt
denote the close-out amount at t ≤ T . In this paper, we deal with two conventions for the close-out
amount eN : clean close-out and replacement close-out. We postpone explaining the conventions to the
next section after we define the hedger’s hedging portfolio. As conventions, dDNt ≥ 0, eNt ≥ 0 (resp.
< 0) means that the hedger pays to (resp. is paid by) the counterparty at t ≤ T .
Example .. If the hedger buys a zero coupon bond of unit notional amount, DN = −1~T ,∞~.
The obligation to settle eN may not be fully honored because of the default. To mitigate the risk,
the two parties post or receive collateral (often referred to as margin). The amount of the collateral
posted at t ≥ 0 (only for the new contract) is denoted bymNt . We assume that (mNt )t≥0 is an F-adapted
process. By Assumption ., τi , i ∈ {H,C}, are totally inaccessible, which means that the defaults
arrive with surprise. Margins are posted because we do not know full information of the defaults,
and this is why mN is calculated on the observable information F. The exact forms of mN will be
given later after the conventions for eN are introduced. We assume that the close-out payment is
settled at the moment of default without delay and mN is posted continuously. As conventions, if
mNt ≥ 0 (resp. < 0), it means that the hedger posts (receives) the collateral at t ≤ T .
Remark .. In practice, there exists a gap between the day of default and actual settlement. The
delay is required to check whether the default really happened, collect information of the contract,
find the best candidate to replace the defaulting party (Murphy, ). Gap risk is the risk from the
gap between the close-out amount at the day of settlement and the last day that variation margin is
posted. For gap risk, two parties post initial margin which is often calculated by a risk measure. Note
that we ignore the gap risk and initial margin. If we consider initial margin, we encounter anticipative
backward stochastic differential equations (ABSDEs) under replacement close-out. For the main result
of this paper, Malliavin calculus for BSDEs will be used. However, to the best of our knowledge,
Malliavin differentiability of ABSDEs has not been studied. Moreover, It is a challenging problem
to solve ABSDEs numerically (see Agarwal et al., ). The continuous posting of variation margin
can also be seen as a simplification. One may want to model m as a càdlàg step process. For the
discussion, readers may want to refer to Brigo, Liu, et al. ().
A part of ISDA master agreement

At default, collateral is not exchanged. Thus, we set the collateral amount posted at τ ≤ T , asmNτ−.
Therefore, the cash-flow at default can be
∆D
N
τ + e
N
τ −mNτ−.
However, it is immaterial whether we separate∆DNτ from e
N or not in themodeling, because jumps of
F-adapted càdlàg processes are exhausted by F-stopping times (see He & Yan, , Theorem .).
Thus, by (.),
∆D
N
τ = 0, a.s.
Let CN denote the accumulated cash-flows. Then, for any t ≤ T a.s,
C
N
t ≔ 1τ>tD
N
t +1τ≤t(DNτ + eNτ )−1τ=τH≤tLH(eNτ −mNτ−)+ +1τ=τC≤tLC(eNτ −mNτ−)−,
where 0 ≤ LH ≤ 1 (resp. 0 ≤ LC ≤ 1 ) is the loss rate of the hedger (resp. counterparty). Recall that
CN is derived from the assumption that the new contract is the first contract between the hedger and
counterparty. Now, we relax the assumption so that we can consider incremental cash-flows.
.. Incremental Cash-flows
Assume that the two parties has made contracts given by some endowed càdlàg F-adapted processes
(DE , eE ,mE) before initiation of the new contract. If the two parties did not enter the contract, for the
bank of the hedger, the cash-flows would be
C
E
t ≔ 1τ>tD
E
t +1τ≤t(DEτ + eEτ )−1τ=τH≤tLH (eEτ −mEτ−)+ +1τ=τC≤tLC (eEτ −mEτ−)−.
On the other hand, when entering the new contract, the exposure and margin would be eE + eN and
mE +mN , respectively. In this case, the summed cash-flows for the bank are
C
S
t ≔1τ>t(D
E +DNt ) +1τ≤t(DEτ +DNτ + eEτ + eNτ )
−1τ=τH≤tLH(eEτ + eNτ −mEτ− −mNτ−)+ +1τ=τC≤tLC(eEτ + eNτ −mEτ− −mNτ−)−.
Thus, the amount that should be handled by the hedger to enter the “new” contract can be given by
Ct ≔C
S
t −CEt
=1τ>tD
N
t +1τ≤t(DNτ + eNτ )−1τ=τH≤tLH
(
(eEτ + e
N
τ −mEτ− −mNτ−)+ − (eEτ −mEτ−)+
)
+1τ=τC≤tLC
(
(eEτ + e
N
τ −mEτ− −mNτ−)− − (eEτ −mEτ−)−
)
. (.)
We denote the cash-flow process after τ by Θ, i.e.,
Θ ≔C− (DN )τ . (.)
We assume that the hedger can access to (defaultable) zero coupon bonds of hedger and counter-
party. Let SH (resp. SC) denote the defaultable bond of the hedger (resp. counterparty), where SH
and SC follow the next SDE:
dS it =rtS
i
t dt +σ
i
t S
i
t dWt − S it−dM it , i ∈ {H,C}, (.)

where (σ i)⊤ ∈ Rn are F-progressively measurable processes. S1, . . . ,Sn are used to hedge DN , while
SH and SC are used to hedge Θ. We define the (n+2)× nmatrix σ as
σ ≔

σ1
...
σn
σH
σC

.
Note that the considered financial markets are complete, since there are n+2 sources of randomness,
W,τH ,τC , and n+2 traded assets S,SH ,SC .
Remark .. By (.), underlying assets do not depend on default risk, which means that we do not
deal with credit derivatives. For modeling with emphasis on contagion risk, readers can refer to
Bo et al. (, ); Brigo, Capponi, & Pallavicini (); Jiao et al. ().
.. Accounts and Hedging Strategy
In this section, we introduce several saving accounts and the hedger’s hedging strategy. In what
follows, we denote
I ≔ {1,2, . . . ,H,C}. (.)
For any i ∈ I , let ηS,i denote the number of units of S i held by the hedger, and we assume ηS,i is
G-predictable. We denote
ϕ ≔(ηS,1, . . . ,ηS,n,,ηS,H ,ηS,C ),
πi ≔ηS,iS i , i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
πi ≔ηS,iS i−, i ∈ {H,C},
π≔(π1, . . . ,πn,πH ,πC ).
We call the (n+2)-dimensionalG-predictable process ϕ the hedger’s hedging strategy.
Remark .. ϕ is chosen to be G-adapted only to describe an immediate action taken at default. We
shall see later that on [0,τ), ϕ is F-adapted.
If the collateral is pledged, the posting party is remunerated by the receiving party according to
a certain interest rate. When mNt ≥ 0 (resp. < 0), the counterparty (resp. hedger) pays the interest
rate Rm,ℓt (resp. R
m,b
t ) at t ≤ T . We assume that the collateral is posted as cash and the interest rate is
accrued to a margin account of the hedger. We denote the lending and borrowing accounts Bm,ℓ and
Bm,b respectively, i.e., Bm,i , i ∈ {ℓ,b}, are given by
dBm,it = R
m,i
t B
m,i
t dt. (.)

Let ηm,ℓ (resp. ηm,b) denote the number of units of Bm,ℓ (resp. Bm,b). Then the following equations
hold:
ηm,ℓ ≥ 0, ηm,b < 0, ηm,ℓηm,b = 0, (.)
ηm,ℓBm,ℓ + ηm,bBm,b =mN . (.)
We assume that the variation margin m can be rehypothecated, i.e., mN is used by the hedger to main-
tain her portfolio.
Remark .. The margin account for mE may be dealt with by other dealers, so it is not a part of the
hedging portfolio.
Some underlying assets can be traded through repo markets. We denote the set of indices for
which a repo market is available by ρ ⊆ I ≔ {1,2, . . . ,n,H,C}. We assume that the borrowing and
lending repo market rates are the same, and for i ∈ ρ, let Rρ,i denote the repo rate. Moreover, for any
i ∈ ρ, let Bρ,i denote the account that Rρ,i accrues, i.e., Bρ,i follows
dB
ρ,i
t = R
ρ,i
t B
ρ,i
t dt. (.)
For i ∈ ρ, we denote the number of units of Bρ,i by ηρ,i . Then it follows that for any i ∈ ρ,
ηρ,iBρ,i + ηS,iS i = 0. (.)
If the hedger has any surplus cash, she can earn the lending rate Rℓ, while for borrowing money,
she needs to pay the borrowing rate Rb. For i ∈ {ℓ,b}, let Bi denote the hedger’s funding account and
ηi denote the number of units of Bi . Therefore, it follows that
ηℓ ≥ 0, ηb < 0, (.)
dBit = R
i
tB
i
t dt, i ∈ {ℓ,b}. (.)
. Hedger’s Incremental Hedging Portfolio
Now, we are almost ready to define dealer’s incremental portfolio. Another ingredient in defining
hedging portfolios is incremental funding effects. These effects will be considered by imposing some
conditions on the hedging portfolio. The detail will be followed after the next definition.
Definition .. If V = V (ϕ,C) defined on t ∈ R+, by
Vt = η
ℓ
t B
ℓ
t + η
b
t B
b
t + η
m,ℓ
t B
m,ℓ
t + η
m,b
t B
m,b
t +
∑
i∈I
ηS,it S
i
t +
∑
i∈ρ
η
ρ,i
t B
ρ,i
t , (.)
satisfies
Vt =V0 +
∑
i=ℓ,b
∫ t∧τ¯
0
ηis dB
i
s +
∑
i=ℓ,b
∫ t∧τ¯
0
ηm,is dB
m,i
s +
∑
i∈I
∫ t∧τ¯
0
ηS,is dS
i
s
+
∑
i∈ρ
∫ t∧τ¯
0
η
ρ,i
s dB
ρ,i
s −Ct∧τ¯ , (.)
for any t ∈ R+, then V is called the hedger’s incremental hedging portfolio.

Remark .. Note that by (.), Ct = Ct∧τ¯ , ∀t ≥ 0, and by (.), Vt = Vt∧τ¯ , ∀t ≥ 0.
Our goal is to find a proper price charged to the counterparty and hedging strategy ϕ satisfying
Definition . and a certain terminal condition. We seek to impose the terminal condition so that
an incremental funding effect should be considered. The incremental funding effect means the dif-
ference between the funding cost/benefit of two choices: entering or not entering the new contract.
To explain the necessity of the incremental effect briefly, consider a situation that the dealer wants to
enter a new contract that makes the hedging portfolio fall in borrowing state. If there have been no
business of the bank before the contract, the treasury department would finance the dealer with the
borrowing rate, and the excessive borrowing cost might be charged to the counterparty. However, if
the bank’s initial position was in lending state before the contract, the treasury department should
consider deduction of lending profit rather than excessive borrowing cost. The mentioned activity
can be seen that the dealer borrows and keeps the bank’s initial portfolio for funding the portfolio,
and returns it to treasury at maturity.
To explain the mathematical detail, let Bǫ denote the endowed bank’s portfolio without entering
the new contract, for some ǫ ∈ R such that Bǫ0 = ǫ. We sometimes call Bǫ legacy portfolio. In reality, Bǫ
is a massive combination of numerous portfolios. We assume that the legacy portfolio is approximately
risk-neutral and grows with respect to their funding rates. Therefore,
Bǫt ≔ǫexp
(∫ t
0
Rǫs ds
)
, ∀t ∈ R+,
Rǫ ≔1ǫ≥0Rℓ +1ǫ<0Rb,
and we denote sǫ ≔ Rǫ − r.
Now, let us think of V as the bank’s summed profit/loss and consider two cases. First, if the
dealer does not enter the contract exchanging C, the bank will have Bǫτ¯ at τ¯. Second, the dealer can
enter the contract with a certain initial price, say p ∈ R, for the contract from the counterparty. Then,
the bank’s initial wealth is ǫ + p, namely
V0 = ǫ + p.
The dealer gains from investing in risky assets and accounts. These revenues are used to pay the
cash-flows C. Thus, in (.), represents the hedging error between the investment and cash-flows.
Recall that we consider complete markets (there are n + 2 sources of randomness, (W,τH ,τC ), and
n + 2 hedging assets π). Therefore, we can expect that we can find a hedging strategy that replicates
the cash-flows with null hedging error up to termination of the contract, either by the maturity or
default. For example, if ǫ = 0, we can expect to find (V ,π) such that Vτ¯ = 0. However, since the
opportunity cost for the bank is the profit/loss from legacy portfolio, the portfolio value at τ¯ should
be compared with Bǫτ¯ , i.e., we seek to find (V ,π) such that
Vτ¯ = B
ǫ
τ¯ , (.)
and the dealer may want to charge
p = V0 − ǫ (.)

to the counterparty. Therefore, by (.) together with (.), (.), (.), (.), (.), (.), (.),
(.), we need to solve the following BSDE:

dVt =
[(
Vt −mNt −
∑
i∈I\ρ
πit
)+
Rℓt −
(
Vt −mNt −
∑
i∈I\ρ
πit
)−
Rbt + rt
∑
i∈I
πit −
∑
i∈ρ
R
ρ,i
t π
i
t
]
dt
+
[
Rm,ℓm+t −Rm,bm+t
]
dt +
∑
i∈I
πitσ
i
t dWt −
∑
i=H,C
πit dM
i
t −dCt ,
Vτ¯ =B
ǫ
τ¯ .
(.)
For now, we do not examine the existence and uniqueness of (.). The solvability will be examined
by a reduced form of (.). The financial interpretation of each component in (.) will be provided
later in the following section. Before the detail, we first discuss the incremental funding impacts by
a simple example.
Example . (Incremental FVA). Let n = 1, ρ = ∅, DN = 1~T ,∞~ξBT for some ξ ∈ L2T . We ignore
default risks and set πH = πC =mN = 0. In this case, (V ,π1) is given by
Vt = ξBT +B
ǫ
T −
∫ T
t
[
(Vs −π1s )+Rℓs − (Vs −π1s )−Rbs + rsπ1s
]
ds −
∫ T
t
π1s σ
1
s dWs.
To consider a net profit/loss to the hedger without the legacy portfolio, consider
v ≔ B−1(V −Bǫ), (.)
and we denote that π˜1 ≔ B−1π1, B˜ǫ = B−1Bǫ. Then (v, π˜1) is given by
vt = ξ −
∫ T
t
[
(vs + B˜
ǫ
s − π˜1s )+sℓs − (vs + B˜ǫs − π˜1s )−sbs − sǫs B˜ǫs
]
ds −
∫ T
t
π˜1s σ
1
s dWs. (.)
Assuming there exists a unique solution (v, π˜1) ∈ S2T ×H2T of (.), for any t ≥ 0, we define
FBA∆t ≔E
[∫ T
t
[
(vs + B˜
ǫ
s − π˜1s )+sℓs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )+
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
FCA∆t ≔E
[∫ T
t
[
(vs + B˜
ǫ
s − π˜1s )−sbs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )−
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
FBA∆ (resp. FCA∆) represents the incremental funding benefits (resp. costs) for entering the new
contract. Notice that as ǫ increases, v + B˜ǫ −π1 is more likely to positive. Consider a case that v −π1
is negative but v + B˜ǫ −π1 is non-negative. If we ignore the incremental effect, i.e., ǫ = 0, the dealer
should consider the increased funding cost. However, in the view of incremental effects, instead,
the deduction of funding benefit should be included in the derivative price. However, the dealer
also need to consider the opportunity cost for not entering the new contract, e.g., if ǫ ≥ 0, the lost
(discounted) benefit at t ≤ T would be
B˜ǫT − B˜ǫt =
∫ T
t
dB˜ǫs =
∫ T
t
sǫs B˜
ǫ
s ds =
∫ T
t
(sǫs B˜
ǫ
s )
+ds. (.)

The difference between the two impacts is the actual net benefit and cost, FBA∆ and ∆FCA∆, that
should be charged to the counterparty. Indeed, by (.), (.) and (.), the dealer would want to
charge
p = E[ξ]− FBA∆0 +FCA∆0 . (.)
In addition, if Rℓ = Rb, (.) becomes
vt = ξ −
∫ T
t
(vs − π˜1s )sℓs ds −
∫ T
t
π˜1s σ
1
s dWs. (.)
Thus, under linear funding models, v does not depend on Bǫ.
In what follows, for simplicity, we impose some realistic assumptions on interest rates, and the
endowed processes, eE andmE . In practice, Rm,i , i ∈ {ℓ,b}, are chosen as Federal funds or EONIA rates,
approximately r. In addition, the difference between OIS and repo market rates can be interpreted
as the liquidity premium of the repo markets. We assume the repo markets are liquid enough for the
difference to be small. Moreover, we assume that OIS rate, (rt)t≥0, is the smallest among all interest
rates. In addition, eE and mE are given before the new contract, so they are chosen exogenously, i.e.,
they do not depend on V . These assumptions are summarized as follows.
Assumption .. (i) Rρ,i = Rm,ℓ = Rm,b = r, for i ∈ ρ.
(ii) Rℓ ≥ r and Rb ≥ r.
(iii) eE and mE are exogenous processes.
Remark .. The assumption on repo market rates given in Assumption .-(i) is merely for sim-
plicity in representing (.). Mathematically, it does not play any crucial role.
Recall that we have not yet specified the amount of close-out eN in C. In the next section, two im-
portant close-out conventions are introduced: clean price and replacement cost. Clean price is basically
the risk-neutral price of DN . By using the SDE that the clean price follows, we can remove DN fromC.
After the elimination of DN , the rest of cash-flows is Θ which is exchanged only at one point τ. Thus,
by subtracting the clean price from V , we can recover a standard BSDE with (G,Q)-martingales, W
andM i , i ∈ {H,C}. Then we further reduce the BSDE to a BSDE only with the Brownian motions by
the typical argument of filtration reduction.
.. Close-out Conventions
When the contract terminates earlier than the contractualmaturity by one party’s default, the default-
ing party should settle the close-out amount. The close-out amount is calculated by a determining
party which will act in good faith (ISDA, ). As stated in ISDA (, p.), “the Determin-
ing Party may consider any relevant information, including, without limitation, one or more of the
following types of information: quotations (either firm or indicative) for replacement transactions
supplied by one or more third parties that may take into account the creditworthiness of the Deter-
mining Party at the time the quotation is provided and the terms of any relevant documentation . . . ”.

The statement leaves some rooms for interpretation. ISDA recommends to consider creditworthiness
of the surviving party, but it is not mandatory. Moreover, it is unclear whether funding costs should
be considered in the replacement transaction. Therefore, we consider two close-out conventions:
clean price and replacement cost. Clean price is the risk-neutral price without XVA. The close-out with
clean price is often called clean close-out and risk-free close-out. Let pN denote the clean price, i.e.,
pNt ≔ BtE
(∫ T
t
B−1s dDNs
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
)
, ∀t ∈ R+. (.)
Clean close-out (or risk-free close-out) has been often chosen in literature (for example, Crépey (a,b)).
Remark .. Bichuch et al. () also considered expected value of discounted cash-flow in ab-
sence of default risk, but in the calculation, they assumed flexibility to choose the discounting rate
and probability measure. Indeed, they chose the pricing measure as an equivalent probability mea-
sure such that (Bi)−1S , i ∈ {ℓ,b}, are martingales. In other words, the amount is “clean price+FVA”.
This choice is for avoiding mismatch of pricing measures to obtain a closed-form solution. We will
explain this point later with examples.
Replacement cost (or replacement close-out) means the price under XVA. In this case, it is not clear
which funding rate should be chosen. We assume that the replacing party has similar credit spreads
to the hedger. Recall that V −Bǫ is the value for calculating the derivative price in view of the hedger.
In other words, one may want to choose the value of V − Bǫ at the default for the replacement cost.
However, at the default, there is a jump in V by πi , i ∈ {H,C}. Moreover, πi is retained in V for the
default risk, i.e., the close-out payment. Therefore, if we take
eNτ =Vτ −Bǫτ = Vτ− −Bǫτ +∆Vτ
=Vτ− −Bǫτ −1τ=τHπHτ −1τ=τCπC ,
the defaulting party would pay the remainder after the deduction of the same amount, basically
nothing. Hence, for replacement close-out, we should set
eNτ = Vτ− −Bǫτ . (.)
In both conventions, we assume that the collateral is a portion of the close-out amount. More pre-
cisely, for 0 ≤ Lm ≤ 1 (margin loss),
mN = (1− Lm)eN . (.)
Note that (.) is consistent with our financial modeling. Indeed, if there is a G-adapted process
satisfying (.), in our filtration setup G, there is an F-adapted process V F such that
V = 1~0,τ¯~V
F.
Therefore, under replacement close-out, the margin process
mN =(1− Lm)eN = (1− Lm)(V− −Bǫ)
=(1− Lm)(V F− −Bǫ)

is F-adapted before τ¯. In what follows, we assume that the endowed margin also follows the same
convention as (.), i.e.,
mE = (1− Lm)eE . (.)
Remark .. (i) The two close-out conventions have pros and cons in financial modeling. Clean
pricemay be disadvantageous to the defaulting party because the default risk of surviving party
is not considered. However, the surviving party’s default risk can be negatively affected by the
default, especially when defaulting party has a systemic impact. In that case, replacement close-
outmay heavily penalize the surviving party. Readers can refer to Brigo & Morini () for the
comparison.
(ii) A similar collateral convention was discussed by Burgard & Kjaer (). For BSDEs approach
on general endogenous collateral, readers can refer to Nie & Rutkowski ().
Before further argument, we provide a lemma on properties of clean price pN . The following
lemma will be used to present an XVA process and simplify the representation of the amount of
cash-flow at default Θ. Readers may want to recall (.), the definition of pN , before the following
lemma.
Lemma .. (i) pNT = 0.
(ii) pNτ¯ = 1τ≤TpNτ .
(iii) dpNt = rtp
N
t dt +Bt(Z
N
t )
⊤dWt −dDNt , ∀t ≤ T , for some ZN ∈H2,nT ,loc.
(iv) pNτ− = pNτ almost surely.
Proof. (i) is from the definition and (ii) is a directly obtained from (i). For (iii), notice that B−1pN +∫ ·
0
B−1s dDNs is an (F,Q)-local martingale. Thus, by (local) martingale representation property, there
exists ZN ∈H2,nT ,loc such that for any t,
B−1t pNt +
∫ t
0
B−1s dDNs =
∫ t
0
(ZNs )
⊤dWs ,
Therefore, pNt follows the SDE:
dpNt =rtp
N
t dt +Bt(Z
N
t )
⊤dWt −dDNt (.)
By (iii), pN is an F-adapted càdlàg process, but τ avoids any F-stopping time. Thus, ∆pNτ = 0 almost
surely, equivalently pNτ− = pNτ a.s. v
Remark .. Note that ZN is the (discounted) delta risk of clean price. For example, consider n = 1
and a stock forward contract with exercise price K , and assume r, σ1 are deterministic. Then B−1pN =
B−1S1 −B−1T K . Thus, for t < T ,
ZNt =Dt(B
−1
t p
N
t ) = σ
1
t B
−1
t S
1
t .

Recall that eE and Bǫ are F-adapted, so they do not jump at τ, i.e., eEτ = e
E
τ− and Bǫτ = Bǫτ−, a.s.
Then, by (.) together with (iv) in Lemma ., under clean close-out, a.s,
Θt =1τ=τH≤t
[
pNτ− − LHLm
(
(pNτ− + eEτ−)+ − (eEτ−)+
)]
+1τ=τC≤t
[
pNτ− +LCLm
(
(pNτ− + eEτ−)− − (eEτ−)−
)]
. (.)
On the other hand, under replacement close-out,
Θt =1τ=τH≤t
[
Vτ− −Bǫτ− − LHLm
(
(Vτ− −Bǫτ− + eEτ−)+ − (eEτ−)+
)]
+1τ=τC≤t
[
Vτ− −Bǫτ− +LCLm
(
(Vτ− −Bǫτ− + eEτ−)− − (eEτ−)−
)]
. (.)
.. Incremental XVA process
We can remove DN in (.) by using (iii) in Lemma .. To this end, we introduce an incremental
XVA process. In both close-out conventions, we will deal with the XVA process instead of (.).
The XVA process is defined by the discounted difference between V − Bǫ and pN . Let X denote the
(incremental) XVA process, i.e.,
X ≔ B−1[V −Bǫ − (pN )τ¯].
Moreover, let p˜N ≔ B−1pN , π˜≔ B−1π, c≔ B−1mN , Θ˜ ≔ B−1Θ, B˜ǫ ≔ B−1Bǫ, and
si ≔ Ri − r, i ∈ {ℓ,b}.
Note that sℓ (resp. sb) represents the lending (resp. borrowing) spread of the hedger. We can easily
check that for t ≥ 0, dp˜Nt∧τ¯ = 1t≤τ¯ dp˜Nt . Assuming there exists (V ,π) satisfying (.), by applying
Itô’s formula to X, we attain that for t ≤ τ¯, (X,π˜) follows

dXt =
[(
Xt + p˜
N
t + B˜
ǫ
s − ct −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜it
)+
sℓt −
(
Xt + p˜
N
t + B˜
ǫ
s − ct −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜it
)−
sbt − sǫt B˜ǫt
]
dt
+
[
π˜⊤σt − (ZNt )⊤
]
dWt − π˜Ht dMHt − π˜Mt dMmt ,
Xτ¯ =Θ˜τ¯ − p˜Nτ¯ .
(.)
Note that under replacement close-out,
Θ˜t =1τ≤t p˜Nτ− +1τ=τH≤t
[
Xτ− − LHLm
(
(Xτ− + p˜Nτ− + e˜Eτ−)+ − (e˜Eτ−)+
)]
+1τ=τC≤t
[
Xτ− +LCLm
(
(Xτ− + p˜Nτ− + e˜Eτ−)− − (e˜Eτ−)−
)]
,
e˜E ≔B−1eE
while under clean close-out, Θ˜ is independent of X. In both cases, we denote
Θ(X−)≔Θ.

Moreover, we define ΘH(X−) and ΘC(X−) such that
Θ˜τ¯ − p˜Nτ¯ = −1τ=τH≤T (Θ˜Hτ (Xτ−)− LHLm(e˜Eτ−)+) +1τ=τC≤T (Θ˜Cτ (Xτ− − LCLm(e˜Eτ−)−).
where Θ˜i ≔ B−1Θi , i ∈ {H,C}. For example, under replacement close-out,
Θ˜
H
t (Xt−) =−Xt− +LHLm(Xt− + p˜Nt− + e˜Et−)+, (.)
Θ˜
C
t (Xt−) =Xt− +LCLm(Xt− + p˜Nt− + e˜Et−)−. (.)
while under clean close-out,
Θ˜
H
t (Xt−) =LHLm(p˜Nt− + e˜Et−)+,
Θ˜
C
t (Xt−) =LCLm(p˜Nt− + e˜Et−)−.
In the case of clean close-out, Θ˜i , i ∈ {H,C}, represent the amount of breach of the contract. Recall
B and pN are independent of V . Therefore, showing the existence and uniqueness of the hedger’s
hedging portfolio and hedging strategy, (V ,π), reduces to investigating the BSDE of the XVA process
(.). Before examining the solvability, assuming the existence and integrability, we define each
component in the incremental XVA and give some remarks on them.
Definition .. Assume that there exists (X,π˜) satisfying (.). Then for t < τ¯, we define adjustment
processes: FCA, FBA, CVA, DVA, and incremental adjustment processes: FBA∆, FCA∆, DVA∆, CVA∆
processes as follows:
FCAt ≔E
[∫ τ¯
t
(
Xs + p˜
N
s + B˜
ǫ
s − cs −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜is
)−
sbs ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
FBAt ≔E
[∫ τ¯
t
(
Xs + p˜
N
s + B˜
ǫ
s − cs −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜is
)+
sℓs ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
DVAt ≔E
[
1τ¯=τ=τH Θ˜
H
τ (Xτ−)
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
CVAt ≔E
[
1τ¯=τ=τC Θ˜
C
τ (Xτ−)
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
and denoting Ot ≔
[ ∫ τ¯
t
sǫs B˜
ǫ
s ds
∣∣∣Gt],
FCA∆t ≔FCAt −O−t , (.)
FBA∆t ≔FBA−O+t , (.)
DVA∆t ≔DVAt −E
[∫ τ¯
t
LHLm(e˜Es )
+ds
∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
CVA∆t ≔CVAt −E
[∫ τ¯
t
LCLm(e˜Es )
−ds
∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)

where (.)-(.) are well-defined. In this case, we also define
FVA≔FCA− FBA,
FVA∆ ≔FCA∆ − FBA∆.
Remark .. (i) Assume that the local-martingales in (.) are true martingales. Then
X =FVA∆ −DVA∆ +CVA∆
=FCA∆ − FBA∆ −DVA∆ +CVA∆. (.)
(ii) O is the opportunity cost of not entering the new contract. In addition, FCA and FBA is the
aggregated funding cost and benefit together with the legacy portfolio. Recalling the definitions
FCA∆ =FCA−O−,
FBA∆ =FBA−O+,
the incremental funding impacts are the differences between aggregated funding adjustments
and the opportunity cost.
(iii) Under replacement close-out,
FCA∆t =E
[∫ τ¯
t
[(
LmXs +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜is
)−
sbs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )−
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
FBA∆t =E
[∫ τ¯
t
[(
LmXs +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜is
)+
sℓs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )+
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
while under clean close-out,
FCA∆t =E
[∫ τ¯
t
[(
Xs +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜is
)−
sbs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )−
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
, (.)
FBA∆t =E
[∫ τ¯
t
[(
Xs +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜is
)+
sℓs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )+
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
. (.)
It is often stated that there is no FVA when contracts are fully collateralized. Indeed, European
Banking Authority (EBA) requires banks to assess FCA and FBA for derivatives that “are not
strongly collateralized” (see Cameron, ). To examine this, assume full collateralization,
i.e., Lm = 0, replacement close-out, and ρ = I . The condition of full repo markets is commonly
chosen in literature. Moreover, when Rℓ ≥ r and Rb ≥ r, we can see that FCA∆ = FBA∆ = 0
from (.) and (.). Therefore, based on our model, FVA∆ is not necessary when the close-
out amount is the replacement cost and all repo markets are fully liquid. However, even in
full collateralization, FVA∆ still exists under clean close-out. This is one of the reasons why
replacement close-out should be discussed.

(iv) Because of FVA, the BSDE of XVA (.) becomes semi-linear. When sℓ and sb are bounded,
the generator is uniformly Lipsitch, so the existence and uniqueness are not hard to obtain.
However, we need to solve the BSDE numerically, and this can be costly when a large netting
set and long maturity are considered. There have been several attempts to obtain a closed-form
solution. However, for the closed-form solution, it was necessary to assume sℓ = sb so that one
can recover a linear equation as in Bichuch et al. (); Brigo et al. (); Piterbarg ().
At the stage, it was an assumption, but we will show that we do not need such assumption by
proving that FVA is either FCA or −FBA, by obtaining either
Xt + p˜
N
t + B˜
ǫ
t − ct −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜it ≥0, dQ⊗dt a.s, or (.)
Xt + p˜
N
t + B˜
ǫ
t − ct −
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜it ≤0, dQ⊗dt a.s, (.)
for many derivative contracts. Then the BSDE becomes linear regardless of the assumption,
sℓ = sb, because one of the spreads does not play any role in solving the BSDE.
(v) Considering different lending/borrowing not only makes the BSDEs for replication pricing
semi-linear but also makes the associated Hamiltonians non-smooth in optimal investment
problems (see Bo, ; Bo & Capponi, ; Yang et al., , for example).
(vi) For modeling incremental XVA with capital value adjustment and initial margin, readers may
want to refer to Albanese et al. ().
Remark .. It is worth mentioning how FVA and DVA related. To see this, we briefly review the
results of Burgard & Kjaer (, ). Let n = 1, ρ = {1,C}, Lm = 1, eN = pN . As XVA was not
incremental in Burgard & Kjaer (, ), in this example, we also set eN = 0 and ǫ = 0.
First, we guess the amount of π˜H . At τ = τH ≤ T , XτH = −LH(p˜NτH−)+. Therefore,
∆XτH = −XτH− + π˜HτH − LH(p˜NτH−)+.
The hedger may want to hedge the jump risk at τH using π˜H so that ∆XτH = 0, i.e., the hedger may
choose
π˜H = X− − LH(p˜N )+. (.)
Indeed, it will be shown later that (.) is the right choice. For now, we accept (.).
Assuming the local martingales in (.) are true martingales, by Definition ., for t < τ¯,
DVAt =E
[
1τ¯=τ=τHL
H (p˜Nτ )
+ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
,
FCAt =E
[∫ τ¯
t
sbs
[
p˜Ns − LH(p˜Ns )+
]−
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
,
FBAt =E
[∫ τ¯
t
sℓs
[
p˜Ns − LH(p˜Ns )+
]+
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
.

However, since LH ≤ 1,
[p˜N − LH(p˜N )+]− =(p˜N )−,
[p˜N − LH(p˜N )+]+ =(p˜N )+.
Then by Lemma .,
DVAt =E
[∫ T
t
Gsh
H
s L
H (p˜Ns )
+ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
FCAt =E
[∫ T
t
Gss
b
s (p˜
N
s )
−ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
FBAt =E
[∫ T
t
Gss
ℓ
s (p˜
N
s )
+ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
If we assume that the hedger’s borrowing rate is higher than r only because of the own default
risk, i.e., there is no liquidity premium, then we can approximate the hedger’s borrowing spread as
sb = hHLH .
With this assumption, FCA becomes a counterpart of DVA, i.e.,
DVAt =
∫ T
t
Gsh
H
s L
HE[(p˜Ns )
+|Ft]ds, (.)
FCAt =
∫ T
t
Gsh
H
s L
HE[(p˜Ns )
−|Ft]ds. (.)
The above two equations show the financial relationship between DVA and FCA. DVA is a benefit
to the shareholders because the hedger may default on derivative payables. On the other hand, the
bondholders will receive a partial amount of the derivative receivables, namely (1−LH)(p˜N )−. There-
fore, the hedger should compensate the funding provider for the expected loss.
When the hedger has redundant money, she can use it to buy back loans that were already issued.
In this case, we may inspect sℓ = hHLH . This inspection leads to
DVA = FBA. (.)
It is important to avoid double-counting for both pricing and accounting. However, in this case,
recalling that (.), it seems that we have two adjustments with the approximately same value. If
(.) is valid for many contracts, i.e., DVA is overlapped with FBA, then one of them should be
ignored.
Indeed, it often believed that recording both FBA and DVA in bank’s account engenders a double-
counting paradox. On the other hand, IFRS and GAAP accept DVA. To remedy this, in FCA/FBA
accounting, which is endorsed by some banks, DVA is recorded in Contra-Liability (CL) account and
FCA− (FBA−DVA)

is recorded in Contra-Asset (CA) account (see Albanese & Andersen, ; Castagna, ). How-
ever, it has been pointed out that FCA/FBA accounting produces large asset/liability asymmetry.
The large asymmetry is partly attributed to the binary nature of FVA. Based on the marginal
effect of entering a contract, the FCA term in CA account does not countervail the FBA term in
CL account. It will be shown later that the binary nature of FVA is related to whether the payoff
functions are increasing or decreasing with respect to underlying assets. On the other hand, because
DVA occurs from derivative payables, e.g., pN ≥ 0 in (.), DVA arises where the payoffs are positive.
Therefore, FBA and DVA are affected by different mathematical structures of derivative contracts, i.e.,
FBA is not overlapped with DVA in CA account. Thus, FCA/FBA accounting inevitably leads to large
asset/liability asymmetry. To avoid the asymmetry, in FVA/FDA accounting, FVA is recorded in CA
account and funding debt value adjustment (FDA) is recorded in CL account. FDA is a benefit that
the bank can default on its liability. It was named DVA in Hull & White (). If liquidity is not
considered, the value of FVA can be approximated by FDA. For the detail, readers may want to refer
to Albanese & Andersen ().
In the next section, we represent (.) as a standard form, and reduce it to a BSDE on the refer-
ence filtration F.
. BSDE formulation
For a BSDE representation, we begin this section with considering a family of maps (φt)t≥0 such that
φt :
∑
i∈I
π˜σ it −ZNt →
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜i .
The form of (φt)t≥0 varies depending on parameters and accessibility of repo markets. Before giving
the general form (φt)t≥0, we examine some examples.
Example .. (i) Consider ρ = I , which is commonly assumed in literature. In this case,
φt : z→ 0. (.)
(ii) Consider n = 1, and constant parameters. Then S1, SH , SC follow
dS1t =rS
1
t dt +σ
1S1t dWt ,
dS it =rS
i
t dt − St−dM it , i ∈ {H,C}.
It follows that
∑
i∈I π˜1σ i = π˜1σ1. When ρ = {H,C},
φt : z→ (σ1)−1(z +ZNt ) = (σ1)−1z + (σ1)−1ZNt . (.)
On the other hand, when ρ = {1,C}, ∑i∈I\ρ π˜i = π˜H . Thus,
φt : z→ π˜Ht . (.)
This case was discussed by Burgard & Kjaer ().

(iii) On the other hand, let us assume that OIS rate is an F-adapted process. In addition, we
assume that for any i ∈ {H,C}, (Git)t≥0 is given by
dGit = −hitGit dt,
where (hit)t≥0 are deterministic processes. We consider non-defaultable and defaultable zero coupon
bonds with the same maturity as T , i.e., S1, SH , SC are defined as
S1t ≔BtE
[
B−1T
∣∣∣Ft],
S it ≔BtE
[
1τi>TB
−1
T
∣∣∣Gt], i ∈ {H,C}.
By Lemma ., S it = 1t<τBt(G
i
t)
−1E[GiTB
−1
T |Ft]. Since (Git)t≥0, i ∈ {H,C}, are deterministic,
S it = 1t<τ(G
i
t)
−1GiTS
1
t .
It follows that for t < τ, σ1 = σH = σC . Recall σ = [σ1 . . . σn σH σC]⊤. We define n× n matrix
Σ≔

σ1
...
σn
 ,
and assume that Σ is invertible for any t < T . Then,
(Σ⊤)−1σ⊤π˜ =

π˜1 + π˜H + π˜C
π˜2
...
π˜n

.
Therefore, 1⊤(Σ⊤)−1σ⊤π˜ =
∑
i∈I π˜, where 1≔ (1, . . . ,1)⊤ ∈ Rn. Thus, if ρ = ∅,
φt : z→ 1⊤(Σ⊤t )−1(z+ZNt ), (.)
On the other hand, consider ρ , ∅ and define 1ρ ∈ Rn by
(1ρ)i ≔
{
0 i ∈ ρ,
1 i < ρ,
where (1ρ)i denote i-th component of 1
ρ. When ρ∩ {1,H,C} = ∅, φt : z→ (1ρ)⊤(Σ⊤t )−1(z +ZNt ). How-
ever, if ρ = {1},
φt : z→ (1ρ)⊤(Σ⊤t )−1(z +ZNt ) + π˜H + π˜C . (.)
Therefore, the form of BSDE depends on the choice of model, accessibility of repo markets, etc.
However, from (.)-(.), we can observe that φ is linear in z,ZN , π˜H , π˜C . As we will see later that
π˜H and π˜C can be dependent of a solution of the BSDE under replacement close-out. For simplicity,
we assume that φ is an independent form of π˜H and π˜C such as (.), (.), and (.).

Assumption .. For some n-dimensional F-progressively measurable process α,
φt(z) = α
⊤
t (z+Z
N
t ).
Remark .. Note that we do not exclude the convention commonly used in the literature that
assets are traded from repo markets, i.e., I = ρ. In this case, we can set α = 0 in Assumption ..
Now, we denote the generator of (.) by gG, i.e.,
gGt (y,z)≔ −
(
y + p˜Nt + B˜
ǫ
t − ct −φt(z)
)+
sℓt +
(
y + p˜Nt + B˜
ǫ
t − ct −φt(z)
)−
sbt + s
ǫ
t B˜
ǫ
t .
In addition, we denote the incremental exposures by Θ∆,i , i ∈ {H,C}, more precisely,
Θ
∆,H(y)≔ΘH(y)− LHLm(eE−)+,
Θ
∆,C(y)≔ΘC(y)− LCLm(eE−)−.
Let (YG,ZG, π˜H , π˜C ) denote the solution, in a certain space, of the following BSDE:
YGt =−1τ¯=τ=τH Θ˜∆,Hτ (YGτ−) +1τ¯=τ=τC Θ˜∆,Cτ (YGτ−)
+
∫ τ¯
t
gGs (Y
G
s ,Z
G
s )ds −
∫ τ¯
t
(ZGs )
⊤dWs +
∑
i=H,C
∫ τ¯
t
π˜is dM
i
s . (.)
Then (YG,ZG, π˜H , π˜C ) provides (X,π˜) as well as (V ,π). However, instead of directly dealing with
(.), we will investigate a reduced BSDE on the reference filtration F. The idea is as follows.
It is a known fact that in the progressively enlarged filtration G, for any G-optional (resp. pre-
dictable) process has an F-optional (resp. predictable) reduction. Therefore, if there exists a solution
of (.) such that YG is G-optional and ZG is G-predictable, there exists an F-adapted pair (YF,ZF)
satisfying
YG =1t<τ¯Y
F, (.)
ZG =1t≤τ¯ZF. (.)
Moreover, we guess that (YF,ZF) is a solution of a BSDE on the reference filtration F, i.e., “for some”
gF : Ω × [0,T ]×Rn+1 → R,
YFt =
∫ T
t
gFs (Y
F
s ,Z
F
s )ds −
∫ T
t
(ZFs )
⊤dWs. (.)
Then, by the terminal condition YGτ¯ = −1τ¯=τ=τH Θ˜∆,Hτ (YGτ−) + 1τ¯=τ=τC Θ˜∆,Cτ (YGτ−), together with (.),
we can expect that
YGt = 1t<τ¯Y
F
t +1t≥τ¯
[
−1τ¯=τ=τH Θ˜∆,Hτ (YFτ−) +1τ¯=τ=τC Θ˜∆,Cτ (YFτ−)
]
. (.)
By applying Itô’s formula to (.), we can find what the proper gF should be. At the end, finding
(V ,π) reduces to investigating the reduced BSDE (.). The next proposition explains the detail.

Proposition .. Assume there exits a unique solution (YF,ZF) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT of the following BSDE:
YFt =
∫ T
t
gFs (Y
F
s ,Z
F
s )ds −
∫ T
t
(ZFs )
⊤dWs, (.)
gFt (y,z)≔ g
G
t (y,z)− hHt Θ˜∆,Ht (y) + hCt Θ˜∆,Ct (y)− hty. (.)
Then (YG,ZG) can solve (.) by the following relationships:
YGt =1t<τ¯Y
F
t +1t≥τ¯
[
−1τ¯=τ=τH Θ˜∆,Hτ (YFτ−) +1τ¯=τ=τC Θ˜∆,Cτ (YFτ−)
]
, (.)
ZGt =1t<τ¯Z
F
t , (.)
π˜Ht =Y
F
t + Θ˜
H
t (Y
F
t−), (.)
π˜Ct =Y
F
t − Θ˜Ct (YFt−). (.)
Moreover, if (H)-hypothesis holds between F and G, i.e., any (F,Q)-martingale is a (G,Q)-martingale, then
(.)-(.) is the only solution of (.).
Proof. By Itô’s formula,
d(1t<τ¯Y
F
t ) = 1t≤τ¯ dYFt − δτ¯(dt)YFτ¯ =1t≤τ¯ dYFt −1t≤τ¯YFt dMt −1t≤τ¯h0t YFdt,
=1t≤τ¯ dYFt −1t≤τ¯YFt dMHt −1t≤τ¯YFt dMCt −1t≤τ¯htYFdt,
and
d
(
1t≥τ¯
[
−1τ¯=τ=τH Θ˜∆,Hτ (YFτ−)+1τ¯=τ=τC Θ˜∆,Cτ (YFτ−)
])
=−1τ=τH≤Tδτ(dt)Θ˜∆,Ht (YFt−) +1τ=τC≤T δτ(dt)Θ˜∆,Ct (YFt−)
=−1t≤τ¯Θ˜∆,Ht (YFt−)dMHt −1t≤τ¯hHt Θ˜∆,Ht (YFt−)dt
+1t≤τ¯Θ˜
∆,C
t (Y
F
t−)dMCt +1t≤τ¯hCt Θ˜
∆,C
t (Y
F
t−)dt.
If we take YG as in (.),
dYGt =1t≤τ¯ dYFt −1t≤τ¯YFt dMHt −1t≤τ¯YFt dMCt −1t≤τ¯htYFdt
−1t≤τ¯Θ˜∆,Ht (YFt−)dMHt −1t≤τ¯hHt Θ˜∆,Ht (YFt−)dt
+1t≤τ¯Θ˜
∆,C
t (Y
F
t−)dMCt +1t≤τ¯hCt Θ˜
∆,C
t (Y
F
t−)dt
=1t≤τ¯
[
− gFt (YFt ,ZFt )− htYFt − hHt Θ˜∆,Ht (YFt ) + hCt Θ˜∆,Ct (YFt )
]
dt +1t≤τ¯(ZFt )⊤dWt
−1t≤τ¯[YFt + Θ˜∆,Ht (YFt )]dMHt −1t≤τ¯[YFt − Θ˜∆,Ct (YFt )]dMHt .
Therefore, by (.), (.)-(.) give a solution for (.). Moreover, if (H)-hypothesis holds,
(unique) martingale representation property holds byW andM i , i ∈ {H,C}. Therefore, by Theorem
. in Crépey & Song (), if (YG,ZG) solves (.), ((YG)τ−,ZG1~0,τ~) solves (.) as well. v

Remark .. This reduction argument was also used by Bichuch et al. (); Brigo et al. ();
Crépey (a,b).
Remark .. (.) explains how the bank’s own default can be beneficial to the shareholders. The
own default can be monetized by buying back their own bond that becomes cheaper. However,
this means that banks can realize the profit only when they actually default. Indeed, DVA is often
excluded from Common Equity Tier  capital (CET), which is a proxy of the shareholder’s wealth.
Note that hYF in gF is an adjustment for an early termination. To see this, let Yˆ ≔ GYF, Zˆ ≔ GZF.
Then (.) becomes
YˆFt =
∫ T
t
Gs
[
gGs (Y
F
s ,Z
F
s )− hHs Θ˜∆,Hs (YFs ) + hCs Θ˜∆,Cs (YFs )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(ZˆFs )
⊤dWs.
Moreover, by Definition . and Lemma ., if ZF ∈H2,nT , for t < τ,
FCA∆t =G
−1
t E
[∫ T
t
Gs
[(
YFs + p˜
N
s + B˜
ǫ
s − cs −φs(ZFs )
)−
sbs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )+
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (.)
FBA∆t =G
−1
t E
[∫ T
t
Gs
[(
YFs + p˜
N
s + B˜
ǫ
s − cs −φs(ZFs )
)+
sℓs − (sǫs B˜ǫs )−
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (.)
DVA∆t =G
−1
t E
[∫ T
t
GsΘ˜
∆,H
s (Y
F
s )ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (.)
CVA∆t =G
−1
t E
[∫ T
t
GsΘ˜
∆,C
s (Y
F
s )ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (.)
and XVA = G−1Yˆ . Still, because of the semi-linearity in (.) and (.), we need to solve (.)
numerically. More importantly, it will be interesting to investigate how much cancellation between
FCA and FBA, and between FBA and DVA, can be expected. We answer the questions in the next
section. Based on our model, the answers for the questions are both negative.
 Main Results
In this section, we show a binary nature of FVA; FVA is either FCA or -FBA. In other words, either
FCA = 0 or FBA = 0. This switching property of FVA is determined by some properties of payoff
structures of the derivative contract. Before the main theorem, we explain the idea by an example
first.
Example . (Stock forward contract with clean close-out). Consider n = 1, eN = pN . For simplicity,
we assume all parameters are constant and let the traded assets (S1,SH ,SC ) given by
dS1t =rtS
1
t dt +σ
1S1t dWt ,
dS it =rtS
i
t dt − S it−dM it , i ∈ {H,C}.

Moreover, we assume that the defaultable bonds can be traded through repo markets, i.e., ρ = {H,C}.
Then
∑
i∈I π˜iσ i = π˜1σ1 and
∑
i∈I\ρ π˜i = π˜1, therefore
φ(z) = α(z +ZN ) = (σ1)−1(z +ZN ).
Let DN = 1~T ,∞~(S1T −K), for some K ≥ 0. We denote S˜1 ≔ B−1S1. Recall the definition p˜N = B−1pN
and
Θ˜
∆,H =LHLm
(
(p˜N + e˜E)+ − (e˜E)+
)
,
Θ˜
∆,C =LCLm
(
(p˜N + e˜E)− − (e˜E)−
)
.
Thus, the generator gF becomes
gFt (y,z) =−
[
y +Lmp˜Nt + B˜
ǫ
t −α(z+ZNt )
]+
sℓ +
[
y +Lmp˜Nt + B˜
ǫ
t −α(z +ZNt )
]−
sb + sǫB˜ǫt
− hHLHLm
(
(p˜Nt + e˜
E
t )
+ − (e˜Et )+
)
+ hCLCLm
(
(p˜Nt + e˜
E
t )
− − (e˜Et )−
)
− hy.
To explain the idea, the hedger should pay S1T − K at the maturity or pNt = S1t − BtB−1T K at an early
termination t < T . For the payment, she needs to retain S1. To buy S1, the hedger may need to borrow
money, so it is expected that sℓ does not play an important role in maintaining the hedging portfolio.
Therefore, we guess
YF +Lmp˜N −α(ZF −ZN ) ≤ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (.)
Unless the tendency of (.) is dominated by the legacy portfolio, we can recover a linear BSDE. For
simplicity, we assume that the dealer had big enough exposure to the counterparty before the new
contract and the initial exposure dominates the new exposure, i.e., we assume that
p˜N + e˜E ≥ 0, e˜E ≥ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (.)
Then we consider (Y #,Z#) satisfying
Y #t =−
∫ T
t
[(
Y #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −α(Z#s +ZNs )
)
sb − sǫB˜ǫs + hY #s
]
ds
−
∫ T
t
hHLHLmp˜Ns ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
Then we will show that
Y # +Lmp˜N + B˜ǫ −α(Z# +ZN ) ≤ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (.)
To show this, we take another transformation, V F ≔ Y # + Lmp˜N + B˜ǫ and ΠF ≔ Z# + LmZN . Then
(V F,ΠF) is the solution of
V Ft =L
mξ + B˜ǫT +
∫ T
t
Ft(V
F
s ,Π
F
s )ds −
∫ T
t
(ΠFs )
⊤dWs , (.)

where ξ ≔ S˜1T −B−1T K and
Ft(y,z)≔ −(y −αz)sb − hy + ξbt , (.)
ξb ≔ (h− hHLHLm)p˜N + hB˜ǫ +α(1− Lm)sbZN .
Under mild conditions, we can obtain (V F,ΠF) ∈ L2([0,T ] : D1,2 ×D1,2), i.e., ∀t ≤ T , (V Ft ,ΠFt ) ∈ D1,2 ×
D1,2 and ∫ T
0
(
‖V Ft ‖21,2 + ‖ΠFt ‖21,2
)
dt <∞. (.)
Moreover, (DtV
F
t )0≤t≤T is a version of (ΠFt )0≤t≤T . In addition, note that (.) is equivalent to
V F − (1− Lm)sbαZN −αΠF ≤ V F − (1− Lm)sbαZN −αDV F ≤ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (.)
To show (.), for θ ≤ t, let (V Ft,θ ,ΠFt,θ)≔ (αDθV Ft ,αDθΠFt ). Therefore, (V F·,θ ,ΠF·,θ) is given by
V Ft,θ = αL
mDθξ +
∫ T
t
Fs,θ(V
F
t,θ ,Π
F
t,θ)ds −
∫ T
t
(ΠFs,θ)
⊤dWs, (.)
Ft,θ(y,z)≔ −(y −αz)sbt − hty +αDθξbt . (.)
Note that Ft,θ(y,z) = Ft(y,z) +αDθξ
b
t − ξbt . Namely, (.) can be written as
V Ft,θ =αL
mDθξ +
∫ T
t
[
Fs(V
F
t,θ ,Π
F
t,θ) +αDθξ
b
t − ξbt
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(ΠFs,θ)
⊤dWs, (.)
We will show V F· ≤ V F·,θ by comparing (.) and (.), and it suffices to show that for θ ≤ t,
Lmξ + B˜ǫT −αLmDθξ ≤0, a.s, (.)
ξb −αDθξb ≤0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (.)
ZN ≥0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (.)
We will show that the above inequalities hold if ǫ is not too big. More precisely, we assume
ǫ ≤ ǫ∗≔ K(BℓT )−1min
{
Lm, 1− h
HLHLm
h
}
. (.)
It is easy to check
B˜ǫT +L
mξ −αLmDθξ =B˜ǫT +Lm(S˜1T −B−1T K)− (σ1)−1LmDθ(S˜1T −B−1T K)
=B˜ǫT +L
m(S˜1T −B−1T K)− LmS˜1T = B˜ǫT − LmB−1T K ≤ 0.
Moreover, by Proposition . in Di Nunno et al. (),
p˜Nt −αDθp˜Nt =E[ξ |Ft]−αDθE[ξ |Ft]
=E[ξ |Ft]−αE[Dθξ |Ft]
=E[ξ −αDθξ |Ft].

Moreover, ZN =Dp˜N = (σ1)−1S˜1. Then, it follows that
ξbt −αDθξbt =(h− hHLHLm)E[ξ −αDθξ |Ft] + hB˜ǫt
=h(B˜ǫt −B−1T K) + hHLHLmB−1T K (.)
Therefore, by comparison principle, for θ ≤ t, V Ft ≤ V Ft,θ. In particular, V Ft ≤ V Ft,t = αDtV Ft = αΠFt .
Thus, (.) is guaranteed and (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). Moreover, (YF,ZF) follows the linear BSDE (.),
so we can find an analytic form of (YF,ZF), namely, (V ,π˜) as well. In addition, FBA = 0. v
Remark .. (i) If ǫ ≥ ǫ∗≔ K(BbT )−1, one may want to consider (Y #,Z#) given by
Y #t =−
∫ T
t
[(
Y #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −α(Z#s +ZNs )
)
sℓ − sǫB˜ǫs + hY #s
]
ds
−
∫ T
t
hHLHLmp˜Ns ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs ,
and obtain opposite inequalities of (.) and (.). In this case, FCA = 0. Thus, the binary
funding impacts depend on the value of initial portfolio, ǫ.
(ii) If inequalities such as (.) are not satisfied, instead of (.) in the above example, one should
consider
ξb ≔hB˜ǫ +α(1− Lm)sbZN + hp˜N −1p˜N+e˜E≥0,e˜E≥0hHLHLmp˜N
−1p˜N+e˜E≤0,e˜E≤0hCLCLmp˜N −1p˜N+e˜E≥0,e˜E≤0Lm(hHLH p˜N + (hHLH − hCLC)e˜E)
−1p˜N+e˜E≤0,e˜E≥0Lm(hCLC p˜N + (hCLC − hHLH )e˜E).
If the hedger and counterparty are both major banks having similar credit risks so that we can
assume hHLH = hCLC , we can obtain the same result as in Example ..
(iii) Note that in the above example, DVA , 0. Consider the same market conditions but
D
N = 1~T ,∞~(K − S1T ).
Namely, the hedger is in long position of the stock forward contract. We can calculate the same
way for the opposite inequality of (.). In this case, FCA = 0, and still DVA , 0. Note that
FVA is either −FBA or FCA, so neutralization of a substantial portion between FCA and FBA is
hardly expected. This binary nature of FVA is a source of asset/liability asymmetry of FCA/FBA
accounting.
(iv) Example . also tells us how and when FBA and DVA are different. FBA, as a counterpart of
FCA, reduces FCA which originates from the bank’s default risk. DVA is also a benefit from
the bank’s default risk, but it is hard to monetize DVA before the bank actually defaults. By
these reasons, it is often believed that FBA and DVA are overlapped, and DVA is not considered
in derivative transactions. However, Example . shows the different mathematical structure
between FBA and DVA. DVA is a benefit from the possibility that the bank may default on its

derivative payables. Thus, DVA occurs where ξ ≥ 0. On the other hand, FBA occurs where the
opposite inequality of (.). To understand the meaning of (.), we set ǫ = 0 and consider
ξ = ψ(S˜1T ) for some smooth function ψ : R→ R+. Then, FBA occurs where
ξ −αDθξ ≥ 0, (.)
where α = (σ1)−1 in Example .. (.) can be rewritten as
ψ(S˜1T )−ψ′(S˜1T )S˜1T ≥ 0, (.)
and (.) again can be rewritten as
d
dx
lnψ(x) ≤ 1
x
, ∀x ≥ 0. (.)
One sufficient condition for (.) is that ψ is non-increasing. Similarly, consider ξ = Ψ(S˜1T ),
where Ψ(x) ≔ a(x − k), for some a ∈ R and k > 0. In this case again, (.) is equivalent to
a ≤ 0. In summary, DVA occurs where the payoff is positive while FBA occurs where the payoff
is non-increasing.
(v) Another reason of belief that FBA is overlapped with DVA may be the convention in literature
that all assets can be traded in repo markets, i.e., ρ = I . Recall that α = 0 when ρ = I (recall
Remark .). When α = 0, by (.), FBA also occurs where ξ ≥ 0. However, we can not
guarantee that repo markets are always available. Indeed, there are some difficulties in using
equities as repo collateral. The amounts of traded equities are smaller than fixed-income secu-
rities and there is no generally accepted method to valuate equities. By these reasons, equity
repo markets are often limited to equity indices and baskets including many securities.
Remark .. To the best of our knowledge, Malliavin differentiability of ABSDE has not been studied.
In cases of clean close-out, the absence of initial margin is merely for simplicity. However, when
we consider with initial margin under replacement close-out, we can not use the same method as in
Example ..
. Main Theorems
In what follows, for the incremental effects, we focus on funding impacts, so in what follows, we
assume that
eE = 0,
i.e., CVA∆ = CVA and DVA∆ = DVA. However, ǫ may not be zero. Under this restriction, we give the
main theorems to show that either FBA= 0 or FCA= 0. We consider deterministic default intensities,
volatility, and funding spreads, but (rt)t≥0 does not need to be deterministic so that we can apply
the result to cases that (rt)t≥0 is a general F-adapted process. These assumptions are mainly for
simplicity. One case of stochastic default intensities is reported in Appendix. Moreover, we consider
a derivatives of European style. For derivatives that has cash-flows at multiple times, we can divide

the interval [0,T ] according to the time of cash-flows. For example, if DNt =
∑N
i=11Ti≤tξ
i , for t ∈
(Ti−1,Ti), we consider the following BSDE:
YFt = Y
F
Ti
+
∫ Ti
t
gFs (Y
F
s ,Z
F
s )ds+
∫ Ti
t
(ZFs )
⊤dWs. (.)
Then we can apply the next theorems for each BSDE (.). The idea of the proofs is similar to
Example ., and the proofs are reported in Appendix. We start from clean close-out.
Theorem . (Clean close-out). We assume hH , hC , sℓ, sb are deterministic and bounded. Moreover, α is
also deterministic and αsℓ, αsb are bounded. Consider clean close-out, i.e., eN = pN , and B−1DN = 1T≤tξ.
In addition, we assume
ξ ∈ L2T ∩D1,2, Dθξ ∈ (D1,2)n ∀θ ≤ T , (.)
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Dθξ∣∣∣2dθ
]
<∞, (.)
E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∣∣∣Dt(Dθξ)∣∣∣2dθdt
]
<∞. (.)
We assume that 1p˜N=0 = 0, dQ⊗dt a.s. Let
ξb ≔sb(1− Lm)α⊤ZN + hB˜ǫ + (h− hHLHLm)(p˜N )+ − (h− hCLCLm)(p˜N )−,
ξℓ ≔sℓ(1− Lm)α⊤ZN + hB˜ǫ + (h− hHLHLm)(p˜N )+ − (h− hCLCLm)(p˜N )−.
(i) Assume that for any θ ≤ T ,
Lm(ξ −α⊤θDθξ) + B˜ǫT ≤0, a.s, (.)
α⊤ZN ≥0, dQ⊗dt − a.s, (.)
ξb −α⊤θDθξb ≤0, dQ⊗dt − a.s, (.)
then there exists (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT that satisfies
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
Y #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −φs(Z#s )
)
sbs − sǫs B˜ǫs + hsY #s
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
−
[
1p˜Ns ≥0h
H
s L
HLm +1p˜Ns <0h
C
s L
CLm
]
p˜Ns ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
and (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). In particular, FBA=0.
(ii) On the other hand, assume that for any θ ≤ T ,
Lm(ξ −α⊤θDθξ) + B˜ǫT ≥0, a.s, (.)
α⊤ZN ≤0, dQ⊗dt − a.s, (.)
ξℓ −α⊤θDθξℓ ≥0, dQ⊗dt − a.s, (.)

then there exists (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT that satisfies
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
Y #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −φs(Z#s )
)
sℓs − sǫs B˜ǫs + hsY #s
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
−
[
1p˜Ns ≥0h
H
s L
HLm +1p˜Ns <0h
C
s L
CLm
]
p˜Ns ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
and (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). In particular, FCA = 0.
(iii) If the contract is un-collateralized, i.e., Lm = 1, (.) and (.) are not required in (i) and (ii).
Recall that when we consider replacement close-out, Θ˜∆,i , i ∈ {H,C}, depend on YF. However,
Θ˜∆,i(y) is not differentiable in y. We can avoid the irregularity by considering contracts such that
either p˜N ≥ 0 or p˜N ≤ 0, dQ⊗dt a.s, i.e., options.
Theorem . (Replacement close-out). We assume hH , hC , sℓ, sb are deterministic and bounded. Moreover
α is also deterministic and αsℓ, αsb are bounded. Consider replacement close-out, i.e., eN = V− − Bǫ =
BYF + pN , and B−1DN = 1T≤tξ. In addition, we assume
ξ ∈ L2T ∩D1,2, (.)
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Dθξ∣∣∣2dθ
]
<∞. (.)
We assume that either ξ ≥ 0 or ξ ≤ 0 a.s, i.e., we consider options.
(i) Assume that ǫ ≤ 0 and for any θ ≤ T ,
Lmξ −α⊤θDθξ ≤ 0, a.s. (.)
If ξ ≥ 0 a.s, then there exists a solution (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT that satisfies
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmY #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −φs(Z#s )
)
sbs − sǫs B˜ǫs
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
[
− hHs LHLm(Y #s + p˜Ns )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
and (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). On the other hand, if ξ ≤ 0 a.s, then there exists a solution (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT
that satisfies
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmY #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −φs(Z#s )
)
sbs − sǫs B˜ǫs
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
[
− hCs LCLm(Y #s + p˜Ns )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
and (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). In particular, for both cases, FBA = 0.

(ii) Assume that ǫ ≥ 0 and for any θ ≤ T ,
Lmξ −α⊤θDθξ ≥ 0, a.s. (.)
If ξ ≥ 0 a.s, then there exists a solution (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT that satisfies
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmY #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −φs(Z#s )
)
sℓs − sǫs B˜ǫs
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
[
− hHs LHLm(Y #s + p˜Ns )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
and (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). On the other hand, if ξ ≤ 0 a.s, then there exists a solution (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT
that satisfies
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmY #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −φs(Z#s )
)
sℓs − sǫs B˜ǫs
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
[
− hCs LCLm(Y #s + p˜Ns )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
and (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). In particular, for both cases, FCA = 0.
 Examples and a Closed-form Solution
Many standard derivatives satisfy the conditions in Theorem . and Theorem .. We will apply the
main theorems to several derivatives and provide a closed-form solution for a call option. In what
follows, for i ∈ I , we denote
S˜ i ≔ B−1S i .
Moreover, recall that in the main theorems, we defined ξ by
ξ ≔ B−1T ∆D
N
T .
. Clean close-out
Banks buy Treasury bonds that return less than their funding rate. It was insisted in Hull & White
() that this shows that FVA should not be considered in derivative prices. We will show that
when buying bonds, FCA= 0 for the hedger. Therefore, if we assume
Rℓ = r,
as in Burgard & Kjaer (), the fair price for the hedger is approximately the same as the bond
price derived from discounting with the Treasury rate. Recall that, in the main theorem, we only
assume that sℓ and sb are deterministic. As long as the spreads are deterministic, we can apply the
theorems to interest rate derivatives.

Example . (Buying a Treasury bond). Let us consider a hedger buying a Treasury bond with unit
notional amount, i.e., DN = −1~T ,∞~. We assume that for i ∈ {H,C}, dGit = −hitGit dt, where (hit)t≥0 are
deterministic processes. Moreover, we assume that OIS rate r is given by
drt = κ(θ − rt)dt +ΣdWt ,
for some κ,θ,Σ > 0. Thus,
σ1 =σH = σC ,
σ1t =−
Σ[1− e−κ(T−t)]
κ
.
Moreover, we assume ρ = ∅. Then∑i∈I π˜iσ i = σ1(∑i∈I π˜i). Therefore,
φ(z) = α(z +ZN ) = (σ1)−1(z +ZN ).
Since
rt = r0e
−κt +θ(1− e−κt) +Σ
∫ t
0
e−κ(t−u)dWu ,
by Corollary . in Di Nunno et al. (), for any θ ≤ t, Dθrt = Σe−κ(t−θ), and it follows that
DθB
−1
t =−B−1t
∫ t
θ
Dθrs ds
=−B−1t Σ
∫ t
θ
e−κ(s−θ)ds
=−B−1t
Σ[1− e−κ(t−θ)]
κ
.
Recalling that ξ = −B−1T ,
ξ −αθDθξ =ξ − (σ1θ )−1Dθξ
=−B−1T + (σ1θ )−1B−1T
Σ[1− e−κ(T−θ)]
κ
= 0.
It follows that for any θ ≤ t, p˜Nt −αθDθ p˜Nt = 0. Moreover,
α⊤t Z
N
t = (σ
1
t )
−1Dtp˜Nt = −S1t < 0.
Therefore, by (ii) in Theorem ., FCA= 0 where ǫ ≥ 0. Therefore, if the initial value of legacy portfolio
is non-negative, the trader does not enter a borrowing position and there is no FVA that should be
recouped. v
The next example is a general form of Example ..

Example . (Combination of forward contracts). Let n = 1, ρ = {H,C}, and the traded assets are
given by
dS1t =rS
1
t dt +σ
1
t S
1
t dWt ,
dS it =rS
i
t dt + S
i
t−dM it , i ∈ {H,C}.
Since ρ = {H,C}, ∑i∈I π˜iσ i = σ1π˜1 and∑i∈I\ρ π˜i = π˜1. Thus,
φt(z) =αt(z +Z
N
t ),
αt =(σ
1
t )
−1.
We consider a combination of forward contracts: DNt = 1T≤t
∑N
i=1ωi(S
1
T −Ki ), where ωi ,Ki ∈ R. We
assume that parameters are deterministic and
sb ≥ 0, hH ≥ 0, hC ≥ 0,∑N
i=1ωi ≤ 0,
∑N
i=1ωiKi ≤ 0.
By the definition of clean price,
p˜Nt =
N∑
i=1
E
[
ωiB
−1
T (S
1
T −Ki )
∣∣∣Ft]
=
N∑
i=1
ωi (S˜t −B−1T Ki).
Since dS˜1t = σ
1
t S˜t dWt , by Corollary . in Di Nunno et al. (), for any θ ≤ t,
Dθ S˜
1
t =
∫ t
θ
σ1θDθS˜
1
s dWs +σ
1
θ S˜
1
θ . (.)
Since σ1θ S˜
1
t satisfies (.), by the uniqueness,
Dθ S˜
1
t = σ
1
θ S˜
1
t .
Moreover, αtZ
N
t = (σ
1
t )
−1ZNt = S˜1t
∑
iωi ≤ 0. By straightforward calculation, for any θ ≤ t,
ZNt −αθDθZNt =S˜1t
∑
i
ωi −αθDθ(S˜1t )
∑
i
ωi
=S˜1t
∑
i
ωi − S˜1t
∑
i
ωi = 0, (.)
p˜Nt −αθDθp˜Nt =
N∑
i=1
ωi(S˜t −B−1T Ki )−αθDθ
[ N∑
i=1
ωi (S˜t −B−1T Ki)
]
=−B−1T
N∑
i=1
ωiKi ≤ 0. (.)

Recall that as defined in Theorem .,
ξ =
N∑
i=1
ωi(S˜
1
T −B−1T Ki ),
ξℓ =sℓ(1− Lm)αZN + hB˜ǫ + (h− hHLHLm)(p˜N )+ − (h− hCLCLm)(p˜N )−.
Note that 1p˜N=0 = 0, dQ⊗dt a.s. Then by the (.) and (.), we attain that
Lm(ξ −αθDθξ) + B˜ǫT = B−1T
(
BǫT − Lm
N∑
i=1
ωiKi
)
≥ 0,
ξℓt −αDθξℓt = B−1T
(
hBǫt −
∑
i
ωiKi
[
sℓ(1− Lm) + (h− hHLHLm)1p˜N>0 + (h− hCLCLm)1p˜N<0
])
≥ 0.
Assume that
ǫ ≥(BbT )−1q
∑
i
ωiKi ,
q≔min
{
Lm,
sℓ(1− Lm) + (h− hHLHLm)
h
}
. (.)
Then, by (ii) in Theorem ., (YF,ZF) follows
YFt =
∫ T
t
−
[(
YFs +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −φs(ZFs )
)
sℓs − sǫs B˜ǫs + hsYFs
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
−
[
1p˜Ns ≥0h
H
s L
HLm +1p˜Ns <0h
C
s L
CLm
]
p˜Ns ds −
∫ T
t
(ZFs )
⊤dWs, (.)
and FCA= 0. v
To find an analytic form of (.), let V F ≔ YF+ p˜N ,ΠF = ZF+ZN , and letQℓ denote an equivalent
measure such that (Bℓ)−1S i is (Qℓ,G)-local martingales. In particular,
W ℓt ≔Wt −
∫ t
0
αss
ℓ
s ds,
is an (F,Qℓ)-Brownian motion. Then (.) becomes
V Ft =ξ +
∫ T
t
[
− (sℓs + hs)V Fs + (sǫs − sℓs )B˜ǫs + βsp˜Ns
]
ds −
∫ T
t
Π
F
s dW
ℓ
s ,
βt ≔(1− Lm)sℓt + ht −1p˜Ns ≥0hHt LHLm −1p˜Ns <0hCt LCLm.
Let At ≔ exp
[
−
∫ t
0
(sℓs + hs)ds
]
. Then
V Ft = A
−1
t E
ℓ
[
AT ξ +
∫ T
t
As
[
(sǫs − sℓs )B˜ǫs + βsp˜Ns
]
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (.)

where Eℓ is the expectation under Qℓ. (.) reduces the computational cost because it changes from
backward simulation to forward simulation. In other words, we can reduce the computational cost
for calculating conditional expectations at each time step in solving BSDEs numerically. However,
the advantage stops there with clean close-out convention and we can not find a closed-form solution
of V F. This is because of the mismatch of the pricing measures in
Eℓ[βsp˜
N
s
∣∣∣Ft] = Eℓ[E[βsξ |Fs]∣∣∣Ft].
To avoid this difficulty, Brigo et al. () considered un-collateralized contracts with null cash-flow
at defaults. On the other hand, Bichuch et al. () assumed that the close-out amount and collat-
eral are calculated by the risk-neutral price under Qℓ (or Qb), namely
eNt =(B
ℓ
t )
−1Eℓ[(BℓT )
−1ζ |Ft], (.)
ζ ≔∆DNT , (.)
mNt =(1− Lm)eNt . (.)
In these cases, the pricingmeasures are aligned and a closed-form solution is allowed. However, note
that (.) is
clean price+ "the hedger’s FVA".
As we will see later, when replacement close-out is assumed, the inconsistency of pricing measures
does not appear and closed-form solutions are given. However, recall that the hedger’s funding
information is already considered in V−. Thus, the consistency of pricing measures is inherent in
replacement close-out.
. Replacement Close-out
In the next example, we deal with a non-Markovian case. This is one benefit of BSDEs and Malliavin
calculus.
Example . (Floating strike Asian call option with replacement close-out). We consider the same
market condition as in Example . except
eN = V− −Bǫ. (.)
Moreover, we consider a floating strike Asian call option:
D
N =1~T ,∞~BTξ,
ξ ≔(S˜1T −B−1T KIT )+,
IT ≔exp
(
1
T
∫ T
0
ln(S1u )du
)
.

We will show (.). By Theorem . in Di Nunno et al. (), for θ ≤ T ,
αθDθIT =
αθ
T
IT
∫ T
θ
Dθ ln(S
1
u )du
=
αθ
T
IT
∫ T
θ
(S1u )
−1Dθ(S1u )du
=
αθ
T
IT
∫ T
θ
(S1u )
−1σ1θS
1
u du
=
T −θ
T
IT .
Since αθDθS˜
1
T = S˜
1
T , we attain that
Lmξ −αθDθξ =1S˜1T≥B−1T KIT
[
Lm(S˜1T −B−1T KIT )−αθDθ(S˜1T −B−1T KIT )
]
=1S1T≥KIT
[
(Lm − 1)S˜1T −B−1T KIT
(
Lm − T −θ
T
)]
≤1S1T≥KIT
[
(Lm − 1)S˜1T −B−1T KIT (Lm − 1)
]
=(Lm − 1)(S˜1T −B−1T KIT )+ ≤ 0.
Therefore, FBA= 0, where ǫ ≤ 0.
As the last example, we deal with a bond option.
Example . (Bond option with replacement close-out). We assume that the same market conditions
as in Example .. Let DNt = 1T≤t(S1T ,U −K)+, where K > 0 and S1·,U is a zero coupon bond with U > T
as its maturity. We consider two defaultable bonds with the same maturity, i.e.,
S1t,U ≔BtE
[
B−1U |Ft
]
,
S it,U ≔BtE
[
1U<τiB
−1
U |Gt
]
, i ∈ {H,C}.
Recall φ(z) = α(z +ZN ) = (σ1)−1(z +ZN ), and
σ1 =σH = σC ,
σ1t =−
Σ[1− e−κ(U−t)]
κ
.
Moreover, recall the definition of ξ:
ξ = 1S1T ,U≥K (S˜
1
T ,U −KB−1T ).
We can see that
αθDθ(KB
−1
T ) =(σ
1
θ )
−1KDθB−1T
=−KB−1T (σ1θ )−1
Σ[1− e−κ(T−θ)]
κ
=KB−1T
1− e−κ(T−θ)
1− e−κ(U−θ) .

In addition,
αθDθ S˜
1
T ,U = (σ
1
θ )
−1σ1θ S˜
1
T = S˜
1
T ,U .
It follows that on {S1T ,U ≥ K},
Lmξ −αθDθξ =Lm(S˜1T ,U −KB−1T )−αθDθ(S˜1T ,U −KB−1T )
=(Lm − 1)S˜1T ,U −KB−1T
(
Lm − 1− e
−κ(T−θ)
1− e−κ(U−θ)
)
≤(Lm − 1)S˜1T ,U −KB−1T (Lm − 1)
=(Lm − 1)(S˜1T ,U −KB−1T ) ≤ 0. (.)
Therefore, by (i) in Theorem ., (YF,ZF) is given by
YFt =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmYFs +L
mp˜Ns −φs(ZFs )
)
sbs + h
H
s L
HLm(YFs + p˜
N
s )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
ZFs dWs, (.)
and FBA= 0. Note that DVA , 0 because ξ ≥ 0, but FBA = 0, where ǫ ≤ 0 because ξ increases in
S1t,U . v
Table  shows the effects of FBA and DVA with respect to option contracts. Only when the hedger
sells a put option, FBA and DVA are both positive, but still FBA ,DVA.
FBA DVA
buy/call positive nil
sell/call nil positive
buy/put nil nil
sell/put positive positive
Table : DVA and FBA with respect to option contracts
. A Closed-form Solution of a Call Option under Replacement Close-out
Under replacement close-out, we can find a closed-form solution. As an example, we discuss the
solution of a stock call option. Let n = 1, eN = V− −Bǫ, ρ = {H,C}, ǫ ≤ 0, DN = 1~T ,∞~(S1T −K)+, where
dS1t =rS
1
t dt +σ
1S1t dWt ,
dS it =rS
i
t dt + S
i
t−dM it , i ∈ {H,C},
for some constants r and σ1. We also assume that sb, hH are constant. Recall
ξ =B−1T (S
1
T −K)+,
φt(z) =α(z +Z
N
t )
=(σ1)−1(z +ZNt ).

It is easy to check that
Lmξ −αθDθξ =Lmξ − (σ1)−1Dθξ
=1S1T≥K
[
(Lm − 1)S˜1T −KLmB−1T
]
≤ 0.
Therefore, by (i) in Theorem ., FBA= 0 and (YF,ZF) follows
YFt =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmYFs +L
mp˜Ns −φs(ZFs )
)
sbs
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
[
− hHs LHLm(YFs + p˜Ns )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
ZFs dWs. (.)
Let V F ≔ YF + p˜N , ΠF ≔ ZF +ZN . Moreover, let Qb denote an equivalent measure that
W bt ≔Wt −
∫ t
0
sbαs ds (.)
is an (F,Qb)-Brownian motion and Eb denote the expectation under Qb. Then (.) becomes
V Ft = ξ −
∫ T
t
(sb + hHLH )LmV Fs −
∫ T
t
Π
F
s dW
b
s .
Thus, it follows that
V Ft =A
−1
t E
b[AT ξ |Ft]. (.)
At ≔e
−βt , (.)
β ≔(sb + hHLH )Lm. (.)
Note that there is no inconsistency of pricing measures. This is because we considered the hedger’s
funding cost and benefit in the close-out amount, eN = V−. To represent (.) in an explicit form,
write
ξ =(BbT )
−1BbTB
−1
T BTξ
=es
bT (BbT )
−1BTξ.
Then (.) becomes, for t < τ¯,
V Ft = A
−1
t AT e
sbT (Bbt )
−1BbtEb[(BbT )
−1BTξ |Ft].
More explicitly,
Vt = BtV
F
t =exp
[(
sb(1− Lm)− hHLHLm
)
(T − t)
]
Cb(t,S1t ), (.)
Cb(t,S1t )≔S1t Φ(d(t,S1t ))−Ke−R
b(T−t)
Φ
(
d(t,S1t )−σ1
√
T − t
)
, (.)
Φ(x)≔
∫ x
−∞
e−y
2/2/
√
2πdy, (.)
d(t,x)≔
ln(S1t /K) +
(
Rb + (σ1)2/2
)
(T − t)
σ1
√
T − t
. (.)

Note that ∂sℓV
F
t = 0. Moreover, in (.),
(1− Lm)sb +Lm(−hHLH )
is a weighted sum of sb and −hHLH . It shows how the effect of DVA is transferred to FCA as Lm
changes. As Lm increases, the effect of funding cost is weaken, since the cost of posting the collateral
is more expensive than the interest rate remunerating on the collateral, namely OIS rate. In more
detail,
exp
(
− hHLHLm(T − t)
)
is a deduction from DVA, while
exp
(
sb(1− Lm)(T − t)
)
is a compensation for the hedger for posting the collateral. However, this is not the only FCA. The
other part of FCA is the cost to acquire S1 and it is included in Cb.
 Conclusion
In summary, we discussed a binary nature of FVA. By the binary nature of FVA, we can recover linear
BSDEs and analytic solutions are allowed. In cases of replacement close-out, the analytic solution can
be represented as a closed-form. As a byproduct, this feature of FVA explains how FBA and DVA
are different. In addition, this result provides an interpretation why banks buy Treasury bonds with
presence of funding rates higher than OIS rate.
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A Proofs of the Main Theorems
Proof of Theorem .. We only prove (i). (ii) can be proved similarly, and (iii) is an easy consequence
of (i) and (ii).
(i) By (.) and (.),
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣p˜Nt ∣∣∣2dt
]
=
[∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣E[ξ |Ft]∣∣∣2dt
]
≤
∫ T
0
E[|ξ |2]dt <∞,
E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣ZNt ∣∣∣2dt
]
=
[∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣E[Dtξ |Ft]∣∣∣2dt
]
≤
∫ T
0
E[|Dtξ |2]dt <∞.
It is easy to see that there exists a unique solution (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT of the following BSDE:
Y #t =
∫ T
t
g#s (Y
#
s ,Z
#
s )ds −
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs,
where
g#t (y,z) := −
(
y +Lmp˜Nt + B˜
ǫ
s −φt(z)
)
sbt + s
ǫ
s B˜
ǫ
s − hty − hHt LHLm(p˜Nt )+ + hCt LCLm(p˜Nt )−.
We will show that
(Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF), (A.)
where (YF,ZF) is the solution of (.). Because (YF,ZF) satisfying (.) is unique in S2T ×H2,nT , to
prove (A.), it suffices to show that
Y # +Lmp˜N + B˜ǫ −φ(Z#) ≤ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (A.)
To this end, we introduce another transformation:
V F ≔ Y # +Lmp˜N + B˜ǫ,
Π
F ≔ Z# +LmZN .

Then, by (iii) in Lemma ., (V F,ΠF) satisfies
V F = Lmξ + B˜ǫT +
∫ T
t
Fs(V
F
s ,Π
F
s )ds −
∫ T
t
(ΠFs )
⊤dWs,
where
Ft(y,z)≔g
#
t (y − Lmp˜Nt − B˜ǫ, z − LmZNt )
=− (y −α⊤t z)sbt − hty
+ (1− Lm)sbt α⊤t ZNt + htB˜ǫt + (ht − hHt LHLm)(p˜Nt )+ − (ht − hCt LCLm)(p˜Nt )−
=− (y −α⊤t z)sbt − hty + ξbt .
Note that (A.) is equivalent to
V F − (1− Lm)sbα⊤ZN −φ(ΠF) ≤ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (A.)
To show (A.), we use Malliavin calculus and comparison principle of BSDEs.
By (.) and (.),
E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∣∣∣Dθp˜Nt ∣∣∣2dtdθ
]
=
[∫ T
0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣E[Dθξ |Ft]∣∣∣2dtdθ
]
≤
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
E|Dθξ |2dtdθ <∞,
E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∣∣∣DθZNt ∣∣∣2dtdθ
]
=
[∫ T
0
∫ T
0
E
∣∣∣E[Dθ(Dtξ)|Ft]∣∣∣2dtdθ
]
≤
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
E|Dθ(Dtξ)|2dtdθ <∞.
Therefore, by Proposition . in El Karoui et al. (), (V F,ΠF) ∈ L2([0,T ] : D1,2 × (D1,2)n), and for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a version of {(DiθV Ft ,DiθΠFt )| 0 ≤ θ,t ≤ T } is given by
DiθV
F
t =L
mDiθξ +
∫ T
t
[
− (DiθV Fs −α⊤s DiθΠFs )sbs − hsDiθV Fs +Diθξbs
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(DiθΠ
F
s )
⊤dWs, (A.)
and {DtV Ft : 0 ≤ t ≤ T } is a version of {ΠFt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T }. Let us denote
V Ft,θ ≔α
⊤
θ (DθV
F
t ),
Π
F
t,θ ≔(DθΠ
F
t )αθ .
Then (V Ft,θ ,Π
F
t,θ) is given by
V Ft,θ = L
mαθDθξ +
∫ T
t
[
Fs(V
F
s,θ ,Π
F
s,θ) +α
⊤
θDθξ
b
t − ξbt
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(ΠFs,θ)
⊤dWs.
Therefore, by (.) and (.) together with comparison principle of BSDEs, we attain that V Ft,θ ≥ V Ft
for any θ ≤ t. Moreover, by (.), for any θ ≤ t,
V Ft − (1− Lm)sbt ZNt −V Ft,θ ≤ V Ft −V Ft,θ ≤ 0,
and this implies (A.) and (A.). Moreover, by (.), FBA= 0. v

Proof of Theorem .. As in the proof of Theorem ., we can check the existence, uniqueness, and
Malliavin differentiability of BSDEs. We only explain the transformation and how to apply compari-
son principle. Without loss of generality, we assume ξ ≥ 0. It follows that p˜N ≥ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s.
(i) We consider a solution (Y #,Z#) ∈ S2T ×H2,nT of the following BSDE:
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmY #s +L
mp˜Ns + B˜
ǫ
s −α⊤s (Z#s +ZNs )
)
sbs − sǫs B˜ǫs + hHs LHLm(Y #s + p˜Ns )
]
ds
−
∫ T
t
(Z#s )
⊤dWs .
Take V F ≔ Y # + p˜N , ΠF ≔ Z# +ZN . Then,
V Ft =ξ +
∫ T
t
Fs(V
F
s ,Π
F
s )ds −
∫ T
t
(ΠFs )
⊤dWs, (A.)
where
Ft(y,z)≔ −(Lmy −α⊤s z)sb − hHt LHLmy (A.)
Since (0,0) is the unique solution of the following BSDE:
yt =
∫ T
t
−
[(
Lms ys −α⊤s zs
)
sbs + h
H
s L
HLmys
]
ds −
∫ T
t
z⊤s dWs, (A.)
by comparison between (A.) and (A.), we can attain that V F ≥ 0, namely
Y # + p˜N ≥ 0. (A.)
Moreover, (V F,ΠF) ∈ L2([0,T ] : D1,2 × (D1,2)n), and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a version of {(DiθV Ft ,DiθΠFt )| 0 ≤
θ,t ≤ T } is given by
DiθV
F
t =D
i
θξ +
∫ T
t
[
− (LmDiθV Fs −α⊤s DiθΠFs )sbs − hHs LHLmDiθV Fs
]
ds −
∫ T
t
(DiθΠ
F
s )
⊤dWs ,
and {DtV Ft : 0 ≤ t ≤ T } is a version of {ΠFt : 0 ≤ t ≤ T }. Let us denote
Vmt ≔L
mV Ft ,
Π
m
t ≔L
m
Π
F
t ,
V Ft,θ ≔α
⊤
θ (DθV
F
t ),
Π
F
t,θ ≔(DθΠ
F
t )αθ .
Then (Vm,Πm) and (V Ft,θ ,Π
F
t,θ) are given by
V Ft,θ =αθDθξ +
∫ T
t
Fs(V
F
s,θ ,Π
F
s,θ)ds −
∫ T
t
(ΠFs,θ)
⊤dWs ,
Vmt =L
mξ +
∫ T
t
Fs(V
m
s ,Π
m
s )ds −
∫ T
t
(Πms )
⊤dWs .

Therefore, by (.), Vmt ≤ V Ft,θ, for any θ ≤ t. It follows that
LmY #t +L
mp˜Nt + B˜
ǫ
t −α⊤t (Z#t +ZNt ) ≤LmV Ft −α⊤t ΠFt
=LmV Ft −V Ft,t ≤ 0.
Hence, by uniqueness of (YF,ZF), we obtain (YF,ZF) = (Y #,Z#). Moreover, by (.), FBA = 0. The
proof of (ii) is similar to (i). v
B Stochastic Intensities
We assume that hi , i ∈ {H,C}, are F-adapted processes, but σH and σC are deterministic. For simplic-
ity, we set ǫ = 0 and eE = 0. Let n = 2, B−1t DNt = 1T≤tξ for some ξ ≥ 0, and we consider replacement
close-out. ξ is determined by an asset S1, but the market is completed by another non-defaultable
traded asset S2. We assume
Σ≔
[
σ1
σ2
]
is of full rank. In this case, we can not expect that the transformation
φt :
∑
i∈I
(σ it )
⊤π˜it →
∑
i∈I\ρ
π˜it
is independent of π˜H and π˜C . By (.) and (.), π˜i , i ∈ {H,C}, are represented by YF. Thus, we
write φ as
φt(y,z). (B.)
We assume that ρ = {H,C}. Then
φt(y,z) =α
⊤
t
(
z +ZNt − (σHT )⊤π˜Ht − (σCT )⊤π˜Ct
)
=1⊤(Σ⊤t )
−1[z +ZNt − (σHt )⊤LHLm(y + p˜Nt )].
Let us consider
Y #t =
∫ T
t
−
[(
LmY #s +L
mp˜Ns +σ
H
s αsL
HLm(Y #s + p˜
N
s )−α⊤s (Z#s +ZNs ))
)
sℓs
]
ds
+
∫ T
t
[
− hHs LHLm(Y #s + p˜Ns )
]
ds −
∫ T
t
Z#s dWs,
We will show that (Y #,Z#) = (YF,ZF). To this end, let V F ≔ Y # + p˜N , ΠF ≔ Z# + ZN , and β ≔
Lm(1 +σHαLH ). Then (V F,ΠF) is given by
V Ft = ξ +
∫ T
t
Fs(V
F
s ,Π
F
s )ds −
∫ T
t
Π
F
s dWs, (B.)
Ft(y,z)≔ −(βty −α⊤t z
)
sℓt − hHt LHLmy. (B.)

It suffices to show
βV F −α⊤ΠF ≥ 0, dQ⊗dt − a.s. (B.)
We denote that for θ ≤ t,
V
β
t,θ ≔ βθV
F
t , Π
β
t,θ ≔ βθΠ
F
t ,
VDt,θ ≔ α
⊤
θDθV
F
t , Π
D
t,θ ≔ α
⊤
θDθΠ
F
t .
Then (V
β
t,θ ,Π
β
t,θ) and (V
β
t,θ ,Π
β
t,θ) are given by
V
β
t,θ =βθξ +
∫ T
t
Fs(V
β
s,θ ,Π
β
s,θ)ds −
∫ T
t
Π
β
s,θ dWs,
VDt,θ =α
⊤
θDθξ +
∫ T
t
[
Fs(V
D
s,θ ,Π
D
s,θ)−α⊤θ (Dθhs)LHLmV Fs
]
ds −
∫ T
t
Π
D
s,θ dWs ,
Recall ξ ≥ 0. Thus, by (B.), V F ≥ 0. Therefore, to show (B.), we need
βθξ ≥ α⊤θDθξ, (B.)
Dθh
H
t ≥ 0. (B.)
If (B.) and (B.) are satisfied, FCA= 0.

